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warfare. Over a decade later, the number and capability of unmanned systems have 
grown and are rapidly expanding in use worldwide, the proliferation of weaponized 
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the current and future state of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) and the 
argument that the development and deployment of LAWS should be subject to an 
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Because of a lack of consensus on even basic issues surrounding LAWS, a ban on LAWS 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
On 7 October 2001, an American MQ-1 Predator, tail fin #3034, unmanned aerial 
vehicle was credited with the first 'kill' by a drone strike, ushering armed unmanned 
systems onto the battlefield and setting off an enduring debate on the role of unmanned 
systems in warfare.1 Nearly a decade and a half later, the number and capability of 
unmanned systems have grown and expanded in use worldwide, the proliferation of 
weaponized ‘drones’ set to touch off an international arms race as nation-states and non-
state actors vie for an edge over their opponents’ systems. To that end, increasing levels 
of autonomy in unmanned systems are seen as a deciding factor in the battlefields of the 
near future.  
The perceived culmination of this marriage of weaponized unmanned systems and 
increasing levels of autonomy are near-future systems that can select and engage targets 
without the need for human input, known as lethal autonomous weapons systems 
(LAWS). Governments, nongovernmental organizations, and concerned citizens from a 
wide swath of backgrounds have urged the international community to establish a 
prohibition on the development of LAWS, driven by concerns that the decision to take a 
human’s life will be removed from human control and given to machines. The case for an 
international prohibition of LAWS has been given recent high profile attention in a series 
of Meeting of Experts on LAWS at the United Nations Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW), which will likely inform the debate on LAWS going 
forward. 
                                                 
1 Chris Woods, “The Story Behind America’s First Drone Strike,” The Atlantic, May 30, 2015, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/america-first-drone-strike-afghanistan/394463/. 
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In discussing the issue before the Meeting of Experts on LAWS, there has been a 
drive to raise awareness of the issues surrounding LAWS and build consensus that would 
inform the development of a prohibition of LAWS. Yet there have been problems in 
getting representatives to the meetings to come to a general agreement on even the most 
basic of issues, including what systems they are even discussing. This is further 
exacerbated when delving into the issue of autonomy in weapons systems and the drivers 
for increasing autonomy for military use. Additionally, there is concern over what would 
qualify as meaningful human control of LAWS and how such systems might violate 
international humanitarian law. 
As the perceived precursor to LAWS, the development and deployment of 
unmanned systems has colored the opinions of representatives to the Meeting of Experts 
on LAWS. The short developmental history of unmanned systems beginning in the 
shadow of World War I and II, has given the systems an air of technological mystique 
and novelty. The rapid adoption of unmanned systems by the U.S. military and the 
culmination of technology and commercial viability has fueled a burgeoning international 
market for the systems, both weaponized and not. Yet it is the public perception of ‘drone 
warfare’ and arguments over its efficacy, that has driven much of the conversation at the 
Meeting of Experts on LAWS. 
Despite a lack of consensus on these issues, some representatives at the Meeting 
of Experts on LAWS continue to call for an immediate international prohibition on the 
development of LAWS. Proponents argue that the many issues surrounding LAWS, such 
as meaningful human control, autonomy, and concerns under international humanitarian 
law, warrant a prohibition of the systems. In supporting their calls for a prohibition, 
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proponents have suggested that previous international efforts at arms control could serve 
as the building block for a new international prohibition of LAWS. Proponents point to 
Protocol IV of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Ottawa 
Process surrounding the Mine Ban Treaty, and the arguments made in the international 
effort to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction, as examples of how and why an 
international prohibition of LAWS would work. In opposition to an international 
prohibition, opponents have argued that the existing laws of armed conflict are sufficient 
in addressing concerns over LAWS or that such a ban would not be feasible, either 
politically or technically. Opponents contend that if done correctly LAWS could 
potentially be more ethical than human soldiers in armed conflict and that a preemptive 
prohibition would ultimately harm many efforts in developing autonomy. 
As the representatives of the High Contracting Parties to the UN Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons prepare to meet at the 2016 Fifth Review Conference in 
Geneva from 12-16 December 2016, the topic of LAWS and the calls for an international 
prohibition will dominate much of the discourse over the week. Yet as both proponents 
and opponents of an international prohibition of LAWS make their case before the 2016 
Fifth Review Conference, there is a clear need for a better understanding of and a certain 
level of consensus built regarding the issues surrounding LAWS. It is vitally important 
that the issue of LAWS is adequately and clearly discussed and that the central terms and 
issues are well defined beyond the hyperbolic filled mess that has been the current 
discourse on LAWS, before the international community should consider making a 
decision on an international prohibition on the development and deployment of LAWS. 
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LETHAL AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS 
 
In the ongoing debate over lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), there is 
no shortage of issues for parties at the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons' 
(CCW) Meeting of Experts on LAWS to discuss. Over the past three years’ meetings 
addressing this issue have attempted to build consensus on several central issues. While 
there is certainly no deficit of definitions for LAWS, there are a few common themes that 
should inform a working definition for use in future meetings. Perhaps one of the biggest 
hurdles to meaningful discussion on LAWS, is the lack of clear understanding 
surrounding autonomy and the inclination to build a one-size fits all metric for 
autonomous systems. Additionally, while there are potentially some drivers for 
developing increasingly autonomous systems for military use, there are other reasons 
why the military might shy away from them. There are also the issues of what defines 
meaningful human control and to what extent LAWS are thought to violate international 
law. It is important to keep in mind that both proponents and opponents of a ban on 
LAWS agree that many of the issues raised regarding LAWS in this chapter are areas of 
concern that need to be addressed, however the two sides ultimately diverge on their 
views of the technology and the best courses of action to address the issues. 
 
The UN CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS 
The UN CCW, the full title of which is the United Nations Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, was drafted in 
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October 1980 and entered into force in December 1983 with 122 nation-states having 
ratified or acceded to the treaty.2 The CCW has two general purposes: “to ban or restrict 
the use of specific types of weapons that are considered to cause unnecessary or 
unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately.”3 The CCW 
has five protocols: 4 
 Protocol I: prohibits the use of weapons with non-detectable fragments. 
 Protocol II: prohibits or restricts the use of landmines, booby traps, and other 
devices. 
 Protocol III: prohibits or restricts the use of incendiary weapons. 
 Protocol IV: prohibits the use of blinding laser weapons. 
 Protocol V: obligates states to clear explosive remnants of war. 
Of the five protocols, Protocol II and Protocol V have separate, parallel implementation 
processes that work in tandem with the implementation processes of the entire CCW.5 
There are annual Meetings of the High Contracting (State) Parties and Review 
Conferences every five years that review the operation and protocols of the CCW and 
mandate and review any work done by the Group of Government Experts (GGE) on a 
mandated topic.6 The CCW meetings are open to all state parties to the CCW, as well as 
any non-party states or any relevant international and non-governmental organizations 
                                                 
2 United Nations, “United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects,” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, accessed May 23, 2016, 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ccwc. 
3 United Nations, “The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,” United Nations Office at Geneva, 
accessed May 23, 2016, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/4F0DEF093B4860B4C1257180004B1B30?O
penDocument. 
4Ibid. 
5 United Nations, “Meetings of the States parties,” United Nations Office at Geneva, accessed May 23, 
2016, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/CE461DB2A1D128A5C12573CD004DB6F3
?OpenDocument. 
6 Ibid. 
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(NGO), who may participate as observers.7 
The issue of LAWS was brought to the high-profile attention of the international 
community by the Human Rights Watch report, Losing Humanity: The Case Against 
Killer Robots, published on 19 November 2012.8 On 9 April 2013 the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Execution, Christof Heyns, released 
his report on lethal autonomous robots, which was presented to the UN Human Rights 
Council on 29 May 2013.9 At the UN Human Rights Council presentation, Brazil and 
France proposed the CCW as the appropriate venue for continuing the discussion on 
LAWS,10 which was further highlighted by the October 2013 session of the UN General 
Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security.11 In the opening 
statement before the 2013 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW on 11 
November 2013, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon urged the state parties to “remain 
vigilant in addressing the implications of new and emerging weapons and their 
technologies. I particularly encourage you to further engage in dialogue on all aspects of 
the issue of autonomous weapons systems, to better understand their potentially grave 
humanitarian impact and to consider their implications in the context of international 
humanitarian law and the Convention.”12 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 Human Rights Watch, “Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots,” Human Rights Watch, April 
29, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots. 
9 Christof Heyns, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extradjudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
Christof Heyns,” United Nations, April 9,2013, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A-HRC-23-47_en.pdf, 
p. 7-8.,” p. 1. 
10 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, “Consensus Killer Robots Must Be Addressed,” Campaign to Stop 
Killer Robots, May 28, 2013, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2013/05/nations-to-debate-killer-robots-at-
un/. 
11 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, “More States Speak out at UN,” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 
October 30, 2013, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2013/10/unga2013/. 
12 Ban Ki-Moon, “United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s Statements,” United Nations, 
November 14, 2013, http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=7276. 
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During the 2013 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW on 11-15 
November 2013, the Chairperson, Mr. Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel, Ambassador of 
France, negotiated an agreement for a new mandate on the subject of LAWS.13 The 
mandate states that “the Chairperson will convene in 2014 a four-day informal Meeting 
of Experts, from 13 to 16 May 2014, to discuss the questions related to emerging 
technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, in the context of the 
objectives and purposes of the Convention. He will, under his own responsibility, submit 
a report to the 2014 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention, 
objectively reflecting the discussions held.”14 The UN CCW Meeting of Experts on 
LAWS first met in Geneva from 13 to 16 May 2014 and has since met on 13 to 17 April 
2015 and 11 to 15 April 2016, renewing the mandate to reconvene the following year to 
continue discussing questions regarding LAWS. Interest and attendance in the Meetings 
of Experts has risen over the three years, from 87 states in 2014, to 90 states in 2015, to 
94 states in 2016.15  
As the primary vehicle at the international level for the ongoing discussion on 
LAWS, parties to the UN CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS have debated numerous 
facets of the development and deployment of LAWS over the last three years. The 2014 
Meeting of Experts on LAWS discussed technical issues, ethics and sociology, legal 
aspects under international humanitarian law and other international laws, and 
                                                 
13 United Nations, “Report of the 2014 informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems (LAWS),” United Nations, June 11, 2014, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/048/96/PDF/G1404896.pdf?OpenElement, p. 1. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, “Ban Support Grows, Process Goes Slow,” Campaign to Stop Killer 
Robots, April 15, 2016, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2016/04/thirdmtg/. 
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operational and military aspects.16 The 2015 Meeting of Experts on LAWS deliberated 
again on technical issues and international humanitarian law, but also discussed the 
characteristics of LAWS, the issue of transparency in weapons development, and general 
overarching issues regarding LAWS.17 The 2016 Meeting of Experts on LAWS debated 
mapping autonomy, a working definition of LAWS, challenges to international 
humanitarian law, human rights and ethical issues, and security issues.18 Since May 2013 
at least 67 state parties have now officially spoken publicly on LAWS in an international 
forum, mostly at the Meeting of Experts, the UN General Assembly, or the Human Rights 
Council.19 While some of the 67 state parties that have spoken publicly on LAWS have 
decided either to support or oppose a ban on LAWS, the attitude of many governments 
appears to be somewhere in the middle. 
Following the 2016 Meeting of Experts, there are now 14 state parties outright 
seeking a preemptive international prohibition on the development and deployment of 
LAWS, though several other states have voiced interest in considering at least some level 
of restriction. The 14 states calling for a preemptive ban are: Algeria, Bolivia, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Holy See, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, State 
                                                 
16 United Nations, “2014 Meeting of Experts on LAWS,” United Nations Office at Geneva, accessed May 
23, 2016, 
http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/%28httpPages%29/a038dea1da906f9dc1257dd90042e261?
OpenDocument&ExpandSection=1#_Section1. 
17United Nations, “2015 Meeting of Experts on LAWS,” United Nations Office at Geneva, accessed May 
23, 2016, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/6CE049BE22EC75A2C1257C8D00513E26?
OpenDocument. 
18 United Nations, “2016 Meeting of Experts on LAWS,” United Nations Office at Geneva, accessed May 
23, 2016, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/37D51189AC4FB6E1C1257F4D004CAFB2?
OpenDocument. 
19 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, “Country Views on Killer Robots,” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 
April 14, 2016, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/CountryViews_14Apr2016.pdf, p. 1. 
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of Palestine, and Zimbabwe.20 Additionally there are numerous NGOs, academics, 
scientists, and other individuals who are also calling for a preemptive ban on LAWS. The 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, which calls for an outright ban of LAWS, is an 
international coalition of 61 international, regional, and national NGOs, which includes 
notable organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.21 More than 3,000 professional 
artificial intelligence and robotics researchers have signed an open letter from the Future 
of Life Institute that calls for a “ban on offensive autonomous weapons beyond 
meaningful human control.”22 Notable signatories to the letter include Google DeepMind 
CEO Demis Hassabis, Tesla CEO Elon Musk, Professor Stephen Hawking, and several 
presidents of artificial intelligence and robotics professional organizations.23 
While the proponents of a prohibition on LAWS appear to be in the majority 
vocally at the UN CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS, there has been some opposition, 
particularly to a preemptive outright ban of LAWS. Although some parties to the UN 
CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS have expressed skepticism or cautioned against a 
rush to impose a ban, the United Kingdom is perhaps the only country which has vocally 
opposed a prohibition.24 The British government has stated that “at present, we do not see 
the need for a prohibition on the use of LAWS, as international humanitarian law already 
                                                 
20 “Ban Support Grows, Process Goes Slow.” 
21 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, “Who We Are,” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, accessed May 23, 
2016, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/coalition/. 
22 Future of Life Institute, “Open Letter on Autonomous Weapons,” Future of Life Institute, accessed May 
23, 2016, http://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons. 
23 Ibid. 
24Owen Bowcott, “UK Opposes International Ban on Developing ‘killer robots,’” The Guardian, April 14, 
2015, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/apr/13/uk-opposes-international-ban-on-developing-
killer-robots. 
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provides sufficient regulation for this area.”25 Canada and France have joined the UK in 
stating that they would not pursue development of LAWS, but have thus far declined to 
support a prohibition on LAWS.26 
 The U.S. was the first country to issue policy guidance on LAWS, Department of 
Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.09, in November 2012 and while the document does 
address many of the obstacles that LAWS would need to overcome for development and 
deployment, it “neither encourages nor prohibits the development” of such systems in the 
future.27 U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work recently signaled that the U.S. DoD 
“will not delegate lethal authority to a machine to make a decision,” though he expressed 
concern that more authoritarian regimes might.28 The U.S. and Israel are the only two 
countries thus far to have expressed interest at the UN CCW Meeting of Experts in 
discussing the potential benefits of continuing to develop and deploy LAWS, yet the U.S. 
was and has continued to be one of the biggest supporters of the dialogue at the Meeting 
of Experts.29 In the U.S. delegation’s response to UN Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns’ 
report on lethal autonomous robotics, it was stated that “lethal autonomous weapons may 
present important legal, policy, and ethical issues, and we call on all states to proceed in a 
lawful, prudent, and responsible manner when considering whether to incorporate 
                                                 
25Ibid. 
26 Mary Wareham, “US Needs to Stop Tiptoeing Around the “Killer Robots” Threat,” Human Rights 
Watch, May 5, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/05/us-needs-stop-tiptoeing-around-killer-robots-
threat. 
27 Michael W. Meier, “U.S. Delegation Opening Statement,” April 11, 2016, 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/EFF7036380934E5EC1257F920057989A/$
file/2016_LAWS+MX_GeneralExchange_Statements_United+States.pdf, p.2. 
28 Dan Lamothe, “The killer robot threat: Pentagon examining how enemy nations could empower 
machines,” The Washington Post, March 30, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/30/the-killer-robot-threat-pentagon-
examining-how-enemy-nations-could-empower-machines/. 
29 “US Needs to Stop Tiptoeing Around the “Killer Robots” Threat.” 
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automated and autonomous capabilities in weapon systems.”30 Yet it remains the U.S. 
view that “it is premature to try and determine where these discussions might or should 
lead.”31 It appears likely, based on the statements of other countries at the Meeting of 
Experts, that the U.S. is part of an ambivalent majority on the issue of LAWS.32 
 
Toward a Working Definition of LAWS 
As the topic of the thesis is somewhat technical in nature and loaded with 
terminology and acronyms, it is important to attempt to define those terms that will be 
used in this paper. From the outset however, there is a problem in attempting to offer a 
single definition of LAWS because there has been a failure to cohesively agree on 
terminology and definitions for LAWS by those working most closely with the issue. 
There is fervent domestic and international discussion, both within and out of 
government, about how exactly LAWS should be defined, in-order to differentiate 
between an ever increasing number of weapons, vehicles, systems, and levels of control. 
The sheer volume of discussion and difference in opinion over the definition of LAWS is 
worthy of an entire paper itself and though it may occupy a comparably small section in 
this paper, it is not to undermine the importance of the discussion. In attempting to limit 
confusion in later chapters, we will have to narrow the definable scope. 
The UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), in its support to the UN 
CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS, researched several aspects of LAWS and noted the 
                                                 
30 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, “Report on outreach on the UN report on ‘lethal autonomous robotics’,” 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, July 31, 2013, http://stopkillerrobots.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/KRC_ReportHeynsUN_Jul2013.pdf, p. 22. 
31 “U.S. Delegation Opening Statement.” 
32 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, “Country Policy Positions,” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, March 26, 
2015, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/KRC_CCWexperts_Countries_25Mar2015.pdf. 
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increasingly complex uncertainty of terms and definitions used internationally in its 
resource paper, Framing Discussions on the Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous 
Technologies: 
An initial hurdle to constructive dialogue on autonomy in weapon systems is that 
different assessments are made by different States, producers and experts as to 
where a specific technology sits on the autonomy spectrum. This is compounded 
by uncertainty surrounding how the object under consideration is labelled: 
“drones”, “robots”, “autonomous weapon systems”, “killer robots”, “lethal 
autonomous robotics”, “lethal and non-lethal” semi- and fully autonomous 
weapons systems, “supervised autonomy” and other terms. The discussion 
presently lacks focus, tacking between things (for example, drones, robots and 
systems), a characteristic (autonomy), and uses (defensive measures? targeting? 
kill decisions?), in an inconsistent and often confusing way. One of the reasons 
there are so many different terms being proposed as the object of discussion is that 
some actors are trying to capture a mix of variables of concern (such as lethality 
or degree of human control), while others are talking about more general 
categories of objects. Some feel that the first step for the international community 
should be to establish shared definitions of categories or particular thresholds of 
autonomy along the spectrum described above (using terms such as fully 
autonomous, semi-autonomous, partially autonomous, supervised autonomy or 
others). However, this is likely to be a long and complex exercise, compounded 
by the fact that different incompatible definitions already exist.33 
 
The footnote to this particular section in the UNIDIR's resource paper takes it a step 
further and notes that “this lack of conceptual clarity is embedded even in the tenses of 
verbs used in the literature. Present tense is often employed to describe systems that do 
not yet exist. This creates significant confusion for the reader in trying to determine the 
actual state of existing technology.”34 The fact that a UN research institute declined to 
tackle the issue of terminology and definitions of LAWS, demonstrates the extensive 
difficulty in trying to move forward on a topic when the nation-states themselves do not 
even completely agree on what they are even arguing over. This is compounded by a lack 
                                                 
33 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, “Framing Discussion on the Weaponization of 
Increasingly Autonomous Technologies,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, accessed 
May 23, 2016, http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/framing-discussions-on-the-weaponization-of-
increasingly-autonomous-technologies-en-606.pdf, p. 3. 
34 Ibid. 
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of agreement among individuals, academia, industry, nongovernmental organizations, and 
government agencies, not only domestically, but also internationally, as evidenced within 
the exchanges at the UN CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS.35 
Although there is a large number of definitions for LAWS that are available for 
consideration, most of them are generally only minor variations of one another. In the 
U.S. DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, “autonomous weapon 
systems” are defined as “a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage 
targets without further intervention by a human operator. This includes human-supervised 
autonomous weapon systems that are designed to allow human operators to override 
operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage targets without further human 
input after activation.”36 The International Committee of the Red Cross defines an 
“autonomous weapon system” as “any weapon system with autonomy in its critical 
functions. That is, a weapon system that can select (i.e. search for or detect, identify, track, 
select) and attack (i.e. use force against, neutralize, damage or destroy) targets without 
human intervention.”37 The Center for New American Security, a Washington based think 
tank which has written extensively on the issue of LAWS, defines an “autonomous 
weapon system” as “a weapon system that, once activated, is intended to select and 
engage targets where a human has not decided those specific targets are to be engaged.”38 
The Holy See has defined an “autonomous weapon system” as “a weapon system capable 
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of identifying, selecting and triggering action on a target without human supervision.”39 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Execution, Christof 
Heyns, defined “lethal autonomous robots” as “robotic weapon systems that, once 
activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. 
The important element is that the robot has an autonomous ‘choice’ regarding selection of 
a target and the use of lethal force.”40 In these five example definitions, they share a 
common thread that LAWS are weapon systems that can select and engage a target 
without human intervention, and this generality holds true for most proposed definitions. 
The problem with this generality is that it can and has been used by different 
groups to implicate wide swaths of existing weapons as falling under the purview of the 
UN CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS. As an example, the Pakistani delegation in its 
opening statement before the 2016 Meeting of Experts, remarked that “the states that are 
currently developing and using LAWS cannot afford to be complacent that such 
capabilities will not proliferate over time, and hence they too shall become vulnerable.”41 
Exacerbating the issue, is that activists describe current unmanned systems as precursors 
to LAWS without clearly delineating them or by including charged phrases about “killer 
robots” and “drones” side-by-side in their reports, which stirs the already muddled public 
perception of what current unmanned systems are.42 Yet most parties involved in the UN 
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CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS generally agree that the focus of the meetings and 
the eventual definition of LAWS, is not aimed at existing weapons, but rather future 
weapons following the current trend of automation.43 The U.S. delegation, in its opening 
statement before the 2016 Meeting of Experts, articulated this generally accepted stance, 
noting that “there remain divergent views in the CCW on what weapon systems we are 
trying to discuss … for the United States, we want to be clear that we are here to talk 
about future weapons, or in the words of our mandate, ‘emerging technologies.’”44 
Despite devoting an entire section in the 2016 Meeting of Experts to discuss 
coming up with a working definition of LAWS, a number of parties to the UN CCW 
Meeting of Experts on LAWS, including the U.S. delegation, have opined that there is 
generally no need to rush to establish a strict definition of LAWS at this early stage of 
work on the subject.45 The opinion holds that while a strict definition might be useful in 
narrowing discussion on the topic, if previous work on international control regimes are 
any indicator, parties will continue arguing over definitions long after the ink has dried on 
the signatures. Still others have argued that attempting to define LAWS is the wrong issue 
entirely and that we should instead focus on the subject of autonomy in weapon systems, 
reframing the matter away from the platform and towards the functions being 
automatized.46  
In lieu of an agreed upon definition by the concerned parties, this paper will 
adhere to a broad, definition based on DoD Directive 3000.09’s definition of autonomous 
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weapon system and U.S. delegation views, that LAWS are weaponized unmanned 
systems that can select and engage a target without human intervention and that these 
systems, with limited exceptions, do not currently exist. This allows us to move forward to 
discussion on levels of autonomy and the issue of “meaningful human control,” which 
has occupied at least as much discussion in the debate.  
 
From Manual to Autonomous 
In discussing LAWS, it is important to establish what makes them so markedly 
different from current unmanned systems. Typically, the debate has fixated on the issue of 
levels of autonomy and their integration with unmanned systems, which unsurprisingly, is 
a hotly contested issue within the UN CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS. There is much 
confusion perpetuated again, intentionally or otherwise, by the synonymous use of 
terminology surrounding LAWS which has often made meaningful discussion tenuous. 
Much of the confusion largely surrounds use of the word “autonomous” and what that 
means for weaponized unmanned systems. 
There are several terms worth defining in pursuing the debate over the 
autonomous part of LAWS. “Automation” is defined as “the technique of making an 
apparatus, a process, or a system operate automatically.”47 “Autonomy” (or autonomous) 
is defined as “the state of existing or acting separately from others, the power or right of a 
country, group, etc., to govern itself.”48 A “robot” is defined as “a machine capable of 
carrying out a complex series of actions automatically, especially one programmable by a 
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computer.”49 Although many unmanned systems are indeed robots, this may not 
necessarily be the case for LAWS, but the term will be used where applicable. There are 
many applications of automation within society today, from many of the safety features 
found on cars to the very robots assembling the cars in factories. Automation is also used 
in unmanned systems, both civilian and military, to traverse predetermined routes, detect 
and avoid obstacles, or return home (base) should connection with the controller be lost. 
These tasks and others like them are preprogrammed into an unmanned system to allow 
certain processes to happen automatically, beyond what is necessary or desired for a 
human operator to be involved in the operation of the system. Autonomy is the ability or 
act of performing automated functions by a machine without the need for human input, 
essentially allowing the machine to function on its own. It is important to remember that 
this ability to function autonomously is also a preprogrammed process, a procedure 
created by human programmers or operators for the machine to automatically follow 
when certain conditions have been met.  
It is important to clarify these terms because hyperbolic language used by some 
advocates for a ban on LAWS has steered into the realm of science fiction and fantasy. 
Discussion has at times delved deeply into the issue of sentient fully autonomous systems, 
combining machine learning, artificial intelligence, advanced robotics, and other 
technologies into cognitive or intelligent systems capable of rationality. Experts are 
divided on whether advancements along that line of autonomy is even conceivable with 
existing technology, that it is likely extremely long-term at best, if it is even possible at 
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all for systems to progress that far.50 Development of LAWS are not creating the Skynet 
Terminators of science fiction and discussion insinuating such is not only fanciful, it is 
distracting from the current issues, and should be disregarded at the outset.51 
Moving beyond that diversion, next is the issue of levels of autonomy in 
unmanned systems. Advocates and delegates at the UN CCW Meeting of Experts on 
LAWS have debated how exactly one categorizes autonomy, in-order to enable a 
framework that could be used to determine what level(s) of autonomy should be banned. 
Most proposed level of autonomy lists tends to focus on the human-machine relationship 
as the primary or sole factor in thinking about autonomy in weapon systems.52 DoD 
Directive 3000.09’s definition of autonomous weapon systems references and defines 
“human supervised autonomous weapon systems,” but the directive also defines “semi-
autonomous weapon systems.”53 “Human supervised autonomous weapon systems” are 
defined as “an autonomous weapon system that is designed to provide human operators 
with the ability to intervene and terminate engagements, including in the event of a 
weapon system failure, before unacceptable levels of damage occur.”54 “Semi-
autonomous weapon systems” are defined as “a weapon system that, once activated, is 
intended to only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been 
selected by a human operator.”55 The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
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(NIST) defined and used four levels of “human-robot interaction” in its work to develop 
an Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems Framework: “fully autonomous, 
semiautonomous, teleoperation, and remote control.”56 The International Committee of 
the Red Cross noted that most literature on autonomy in weapons systems tended to 
differentiate three general levels: “remote controlled (or tele-operated), automated, and 
autonomous.”57 The general idea held by some activists is that there should be a metric 
that one could use to measure movement from one end of the autonomy spectrum to the 
other. 
Yet the DoD’s Defense Science Board (DSB) argued in its Task Force Report: The 
Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems that “the DoD should abandon the debate over 
definitions of levels of autonomy and embrace a three-facet (cognitive echelon, mission 
timelines, human-machine system trade spaces) autonomous systems framework.”58 After 
reviewing many DoD funded studies on levels of autonomy, the DSB concluded that not 
only was the debate not helpful, but rather it was counterproductive, “because they focus 
too much attention on the computer rather than on the collaboration between the 
computer and its operator/supervisor to achieve the desired capabilities and effects.”59 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Multinational Capability Development 
Campaign came to a similar conclusion, recommending a framework built around 
autonomous functions, rather than the classification of systems.60 Paul Scharre and 
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Michael C. Horrowitz at the Center for a New American Security believe it to be more 
fruitful to think of autonomy as existing not on one scale, but rather several independent 
ones.61 Their suggestion is that the scales for autonomy should at least focus on the 
human-machine relationship, the machine’s complexity, and the type of process being 
automated.62 They argue that determining the role and extent of human involvement in a 
machine’s automation, recognizing how simplistic or complex the machine being 
automated is, and identifying the type of process or processes that are being automated, 
allows a decoupling of many of the arguments over blanket categorizations.63 
Understanding that automation or autonomy has been used in military systems 
and unmanned systems for decades, it is important to recognize the intersection of the 
human-machine relationship, particularly in regards to targeting and engagement, in 
discussing LAWS. Generally, there are considered three separate intersects of the human 
and machine relationship: “human-in-the-loop, human-on-the-loop, and human-out-of-
the-loop.”64 “Human-in-the-loop” targeting means that an operator has designated 
specific targets to be engaged and the machine uses autonomy to engage the targets.65 
“Human-on-the-loop” targeting denotes that a machine uses autonomy to select and 
engage targets without designation by the operator, but that the operator can monitor the 
machine and intervene at any point.66 “Human-out-of-the-loop” means that the machine 
uses autonomy to select and engage targets without designation by the operator and the 
operator does not have the capability to monitor or intervene.67 
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Human-in-the-loop systems have been used by militaries the world over for 
decades, the most basic example of which are guided munitions.68 An operator fires the 
munition, the munition uses automated processes to correct firing errors, and engages the 
target.69 Human-on-the-loop systems are also in use currently, an example being the 
plethora of active counter-missile systems.70 These systems target and engage incoming 
projectiles without the operator’s input, but the operator is aware of the system’s 
operation and can deactivate it.71 Human-out-of-the-loop systems are largely nonexistent 
in today’s militaries, with perhaps the rare existing example being loitering munitions 
like the Israeli Harpy.72 Once launched, the Harpy searches a target area for radar coming 
from radar systems, and once acquiring a positive signature, engages the target, all 
without an operator to monitor or intervene.73 In the debate over LAWS, most parties are 
concerned with the development and deployment of human-out-of-the-loop systems and 
to a lesser degree, human-on-the-loop systems beyond their current uses. 
Another important consideration in discussing autonomy and LAWS is the 
complexity of the machine that is being autotomized along with the operating 
environment of the system. Technically speaking, mines are human-out-of-the-loop 
systems that operate on a very limited concept of targeting, engagement, and freedom of 
action.74 Yet while there have been multiple international efforts to ban the use of mines, 
they are not debated as part of the discussion on LAWS because as a system they are so 
simplistic as to fall outside the purview. Close-in weapon systems (CIWS) mounted on 
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naval vessels and used to fire upon incoming missiles are relatively more complex 
systems that can be switched between either human-in or human-on-the-loop modes.75 
Yet the CIWS themselves have such a narrow operating environment, on ships at sea with 
limited range and limited target sets, that even if they became human-out-of-the-loop 
systems, there would be little difference from their current state. A very complex system, 
such as a UAV, with a human-out-of-the-loop system, however, would be cause for great 
concern in the debate on LAWS. Thankfully no such systems currently exist, nor are 
there any countries known to be developing them, but such a system is definitely on the 
minds of the parties debating LAWS. 
In considering the type of function or process being automated in regards to 
LAWS, discussion largely focuses around targeting and engagement of targets. The 
previously mentioned use of automation by UAVs in take-off, navigation, and landing, 
allow the individual to at times be considered more operator than pilot, but these complex 
systems would not become radically more ‘dangerous’ by making those functions entirely 
human-out-of-the-loop. It is the automation of the “critical functions” of target 
acquisition, tracking, selection, and engagement that is cause for concern by activists.76 
As such, the LAWS that both proponents and opponents are concerned with would be a 
human-out-of-the-loop complex unmanned system that has its critical functions 
automated. 
 
Drivers of Autonomy 
It is important in discussing LAWS to recognize that there are real and valid 
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reasons for militaries to pursue increasing levels of autonomy in unmanned systems. 
Unmanned systems can act as a relatively cheap force multiplier that allows for 
penetration of adversarial space over long periods of time without placing military 
personnel at risk, which is just as attractive to the policymaker as it is to the battlefield 
commander.77 Yet as the number of unmanned systems, particularly UAVs, have 
expanded since the beginning of the War on Terror, so too has the support infrastructure 
needed to sustain them and the limitations that come with it. 
One of the reasons driving increasing automation in unmanned systems, is a 
solution to the number and needs of the human personnel supporting them. Despite being 
unmanned, many of the unmanned systems in use by the U.S. military today are remote 
controlled, which means they still require a human at the controls. The flood of UAVs 
that have entered military service in the last decade and a half and the growing range and 
number of missions required have severely strained the ability of the pilots to keep 
pace.78 U.S. Air Force UAV pilots feel overworked, overstressed, and underappreciated, 
which when coupled with low recruitment and retention rates, has caused the Air Force to 
struggle with a shortage of pilots since at least 2007.79 The number of U.S. Air Force 
UAV operations has increased fivefold since 2006, requiring an estimated 8,000 service 
members to support the tempo of operations, yet the Air Force still seeks at least 500 
additional pilots alone.80 Increasing the autonomy of the UAV fleet could reduce the 
requirements on and numbers of pilots needed to support the systems, which might also 
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be attractive cost efficiently as well.81 
Another reason driving increased autonomy in unmanned systems is the potential 
to reduce reliance on communication links needed to operate the systems. As the number 
of UAVs has increased, so too has the need for high-speed bandwidth to enable effective 
and reliable communication between the operator and the aircraft, which has severely 
strained military satellite networks and led to increased reliance on commercial satellite 
services.82 The communication network between operator and system is also susceptible 
to disruption, intentional or otherwise. Intentional disruption techniques used against an 
unmanned system through hacking, jamming, or spoofing, could enable an adversary to 
disrupt, degrade, or even take control of an unmanned system and use it to their own 
aims.83 On 4 December 2011 an American RQ-170 was brought down by the Iranian 
military by jamming the UAV’s communication signal and then spoofing its system into 
landing inside Iran, all without the need to break U.S. signal data encryption.84 Even if 
communications were not disrupted intentionally, it would be desirable to have an 
unmanned system operate autonomously to some degree in-case of accidental or 
environmental degradation of the signal, to prevent an accident or loss of a system.85 
An additional driver of increased autonomy in unmanned systems are the limits of 
the human operators themselves. The capability of an autonomous system to perform 
significantly faster than a human operator at certain quantitative tasks, particularly in 
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regards to decision making and reaction to rapidly escalating situations, is an advantage 
over adversarial systems controlled solely by human operators.86 As unmanned systems 
advance in capability and perhaps one day need to compete in contested environments, 
the latency between operator and system due to either communication signal or operator 
limitation could spell the destruction of the system, even more so if the opponent is 
actively attempting to exploit the signal connection.87 Other human factors that might 
influence an operator’s capability, “such as the tendency to make mistakes over time, the 
susceptibility to fatigue and low morale, and the potential for cognition and perception to 
be impaired by environmental circumstances,” might lead to increasing automation of at 
least many of the repetitive tasks inherent with a remote controlled system.88 
There are other reasons why increasingly autonomous unmanned systems might 
make military sense, such as risk reduction for one’s own forces, freeing up humans from 
dull or repetitive nonessential tasks, greater levels of accuracy or reliability in certain 
tasks, and perhaps even the possibility to respect the laws of war better than humans do.89  
Yet for all the reasons why autonomy in unmanned systems might make sense or 
be attractive options for battlefield commanders, there are other reasons why they might 
shy away from them, particularly from LAWS. Advancements in rapid communication 
and information sharing have allowed modern battlefield commanders to centralize 
awareness and control of increasingly lower level tasks, which the use of LAWS would 
seemingly running counter to, by delegating control out of human hands.90 Commanders 
may also be hesitant to trust in the predictability and reliability of LAWS to perform as 
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expected in battlefield situations, often under unique and evolving circumstances, where 
failure might result from any number of potential causes.91 Additionally, while LAWS 
could potentially behave more lawfully or more discriminately than humans in battlefield 
situations, a commander might fear being held accountable for the actions of a system 
that he may not feel he has control over. These are but a few reasons why despite valid 
drivers for autonomy, there may be hesitancy in the military to develop and use LAWS.  
 
Meaningful Human Control 
One of the recurring themes that has emerged from the UN CCW Meeting of 
Experts on LAWS is a proposed set of requirements that could be applied to all weapons 
systems, not just LAWS, to determine whether human operators have a “meaningful level 
of control of the system.”92 Another major issue in the debate over LAWS and autonomy, 
is defining “meaningful human control” and how it impacts the development and 
deployment of autonomy. This litmus test of accountability would be designed to ensure 
that operators of increasingly autonomous weapons systems are making conscious 
decisions and remain legally and morally accountable for their decisions and that the 
systems should be built to account for this.93  
Yet like so many other issues in discussing LAWS there is little consensus and 
much confusion about what exactly qualifies as meaningful human control. The UK non-
governmental organization (NGO) Article 36 was the first to coin the term meaningful 
human control, though human control of weapon systems is certainly not a new 
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concept.94 The focus of Article 36’s meaningful human control was control of individual 
attacks, believing that undertaking multiple attacks would cause human control to cease 
to be meaningful.95 Article 36 laid out three requirements for “meaningful human 
control:”96 
 Information – a human operator, and others responsible for attack planning, need 
to have adequate contextual information on the target area of an attack, 
information on why any specific object has been suggested as a target for attack, 
information on mission objectives, and information on the immediate and longer-
term weapon effects that will be created from an attack in that context. 
 Action – initiating the attack should require a positive action by a human operator. 
 Accountability – those responsible for assessing the information and executing the 
attack need to be accountable for the outcomes of the attack. 
The International Committee for Robot Arms Control has also listed three minimum 
necessary conditions for “meaningful human control,” in their statements before the 2014 
UN CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS: 97 
 First, a human commander (or operator) must have full contextual and situational 
awareness of the target area and be able to perceive and react to any change or 
unanticipated situations that may have arisen since planning the attack. 
 Second, there must be active cognitive participation in the attack and sufficient 
time for deliberation on the nature of the target, its significance in terms of the 
necessity and appropriateness of attack, and likely incidental and possible 
accidental effects of the attack. 
 Third, there must be a means for the rapid suspension or abortion of the attack. 
Thus far there has been little agreement on what requirements or conditions would 
be necessary for a framework of meaningful human control. While the phrase meaningful 
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human control appears to have gained traction, at least in principle, with most parties at 
the UN CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS, there have been concerns about the 
terminology. The U.S. delegation, supported by the Israeli delegation, has suggested that 
the terminology is subjective and that it is more appropriate to discuss “appropriate levels 
of human judgement” instead, which appears in DoD Directive 3000.09.98 Article 36 
itself even noted that “whilst this paper uses the term ‘meaningful human control’ there 
are other terms that refer to the same or similar concepts. These include ‘significant’, 
‘appropriate’, ‘proper’, or ‘necessary’ ‘human judgement’ or ‘human involvement’.”99  
Whatever one wishes to call it, it is important to reach at least a general working 
consensus on the issue of meaningful human control, before the discussion becomes 
bogged down solely on trying to define ‘meaningful’ or ‘control’. Generally, most 
discussion over meaningful human control in LAWS centers around the need for a certain 
level of information to be available to human operators that allows them to make 
informed and meaningful decisions in an appropriate timeframe and that they are held 
accountable for their decisions. It may also be important to consider what exactly we 
envision there to be meaningful human control of, be it just the targeting and engagement 
phase or the entire system at large.100 In that regard, discussing meaningful human control 
is somewhat different than consideration of an operator’s place in regards to the ‘loop,’ as 
it is explicit in its emphasis on the quality of operator control and the responsibility for 
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their actions.101 However one chooses to define meaningful human control, it is important 
to activists that the focus is maintained on ensuring that LAWS conform and comply with 
the laws of war and international humanitarian law. 
There are at least two different viewpoints on the concept of meaningful human 
control and international humanitarian law.102 The first, is that the laws of war adequately 
cover the development and use of LAWS and that the issue of meaningful human control 
is not a new, additional requirement, but instead ensures compliance with existing 
international humanitarian law.103 The second, is that the existing laws of war are 
insufficient for LAWS and thus meaningful human control is a separate, additional 
requirement that LAWS must meet.104 Regardless of viewpoint, there is general 
agreement that several aspects of international humanitarian law are challenged by 
LAWS and that these challenges must be addressed by some measure of meaningful 
human control.105  
The concern of both viewpoints is to ensure that no “accountability gap” would 
exist that could create an ethical, moral, or legal gray area that would fail to assign 
responsibility to the actions of the commander and operator using LAWS or to the errors 
of the programmer and manufacturer who created the LAWS.106 Roboticist Jai Galliott 
argues that despite claims of a potential accountability gap, “it would be preposterous to 
overlook the role of programmers, cognitive scientists, engineers and others involved in 
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building these autonomous systems. And even if we did, what of the commander, military 
force and government that made the decision to use the system?”107 Jai Galliott contends 
that LAWS and those who create and use them, just as with traditional weapons systems 
and soldiers, would not suddenly somehow be beyond the prosecution of the law.108 Yet 
ensuring accountability for the actions of LAWS continues to pose a serious challenge, 
one that will need to be met by meaningful human control and answered in how LAWS 
are programmed to comply with the laws of war and international humanitarian law. 
 
Concerns Under International Humanitarian Law 
In the ongoing debate over the issues before the UN CCW Meeting of Experts on 
LAWS, perhaps the most passionately argued case over a prohibition of LAWS is that by 
the human rights community. Activists have argued that LAWS would likely break 
international humanitarian law, violate human rights, and lead to even further 
dehumanization of war. These concerns cannot and should not be easily ignored or chided, 
as their importance brought initial attention to the issue of LAWS and continues to drive 
much of the international interest in the issue.  
The most notable perceived challenges are to the jus in bello concepts of 
distinction and proportionality, though others such as military necessity and precautions 
in attack, can also be considered.109 The general concern is that perceived technological 
limitations would not allow LAWS to be able to adhere to international law or that their 
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adherence would not be at a comparable level to that of humans.110 While the use of 
LAWS might be acceptable outright under international law in very situationally specific 
environments, such as areas with no civilians, little risk to civilians and civilian objects, 
or in purely machine v. machine operations, these circumstances would be markedly 
different from the current trend in warfare over the last several decades.111 These 
concerns are drawn from several important historical and contemporary considerations 
regarding the conduct of war and international humanitarian law. 
The first concern is that LAWS would not adhere to the concept of distinction, 
either of civilian and military targets or between combatants, persons hors de combat, and 
civilians.112 There are four Articles under the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions that are the basis for the argument regarding LAWS and the concept of 
distinction: Article 41, Article 48, Article 50, and Article 52. Article 48 is the basis for the 
concept of distinction and states that: 113  
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the 
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives. 
 
Article 52 offers protection to civilian objects and defines them by defining military 
objectives,114 Article 50 defines civilians and civilian populations and includes the 
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concept of doubt,115 and Article 41 prohibits attacks against persons hors de combat 
(outside the fight).116 Adhering to the concept of distinction is one of the greatest 
challenges likely to face LAWS in adhering to international humanitarian law because 
distinction would require a qualitative, rather than quantitative, judgement.117 Qualitative 
judgements would have to be preprogrammed across an incredibly huge range of factors, 
which would be extremely difficult under even the best of circumstances, but would also 
need to be able to determine certain abstract characteristics necessary to make a 
judgement based on distinction, such as intent and doubt.118 
The second concern is that that LAWS could not adhere to the concept of 
proportionality, recognizing that certain engagement against military targets may 
incidentally affect civilians or civilian objects.119 Article 51(5)(b) under the Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions is the basis for the formulation of decisions based 
on proportionality, stating that “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.” 120 
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The concept of proportionality is another exceptionally difficult challenge likely to face 
LAWS because the concept requires a qualitative judgement on an entirely case-by-case 
basis, in a battlefield situation, of whether the loss to civilians would be too excessive in 
relation to the military advantages anticipated from the action.121 Such decisions in the 
midst of an ongoing military operation depend heavily on the context of the decision in 
relation to the larger picture and are subjective, not objective, in value, which would 
require a near infinite number of scenarios to be preprogrammed.122 
There are several other concerns regarding LAWS, such as the rule of precautions 
in attack and the principle of military necessity. The rule of precautions in attack is 
outlined in Article 57(2) under the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and 
requires that constant evaluations must be made to spare civilians and civilians objects 
during the conduct of hostilities.123 The principle of military necessity is closely related to 
proportionality, in that it “permits measures which are actually necessary to accomplish a 
legitimate military purpose and are not otherwise prohibited by international 
humanitarian law.”124 Adherence to the rule of precautions in attack pose several 
challenges to LAWS, such as a need to assess the feasibility of any precautions, verify the 
nature of the military objective, choose means and methods to avoid or minimize 
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incidental loss, and the obligation to suspend an attack.125 Observance of the principle of 
military necessity would require LAWS to make subjective judgements about whether an 
engagement was a legitimate military purpose that would weaken the military capacity 
and capability of either an opposing combatant or that of the opposing party in armed 
conflict.126 The concerns over the rule of precautions in attack and the principle of 
military necessity are no less important and no less difficult challenges for LAWS to 
overcome than that of distinction and proportionality. 
LAWS are also considered to be a concern under the Martens Clause and other 
general human rights concepts, such as human dignity, the right to live, and the moral and 
ethical responsibility in the application of force, among other issues. The Martens Clause, 
outlined in Article 1(2) under the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, states 
that ”in cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians 
and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of 
international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and 
from the dictates of public conscience.” 127 The Martens Clause encompasses principles 
not found in the treaty by requiring that the means of warfare be held to a higher standard 
of examination according to the “principles of humanity” and “dictates of public 
conscience,” which would seem a truly difficult standard to surmount for LAWS because 
they are distinctly without the qualities that would allow them to relate to humans.128 
Concerns raised over the aforementioned ‘other general human rights concepts’ are an 
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extension of this argument, that machines cannot and should not be allowed to take 
human lives because it is an erosion of the concepts of humanity.129  
While the debate continues on addressing these concerns, some opponents to a 
ban on LAWS see the systems as potentially benefiting international humanitarian law 
and the conduct of war, rather than violating it. The Heritage Foundation’s Steven Groves 
has written that the U.S. should oppose attempts to force a ban on LAWS because DoD 
Directive 3000.09 mandates appropriate levels of human judgement be built into LAWS 
and that U.S. soldiers are required to follow the laws of armed conflict, which would 
extend to their use of LAWS.130 He goes on to argue that as a nonexistent weapon, “there 
is no evidence that LAWS constitute per se violations of the principles of distinction and 
proportionality,” and instead LAWS may “have the potential to increase U.S. 
effectiveness on the battlefield while decreasing collateral damage and loss of human 
life.”131 Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, like Groves, also espouse the 
“humanitarian risks to prohibition, given the possibility that autonomous weapons 
systems could in the long run be more discriminating and ethically preferable to 
alternatives.”132 This sentiment of ethical LAWS is echoed by roboticist Ronald Arkin, 
who argues that “the status quo is unacceptable with respect to noncombatant deaths. It 
may be possible to save noncombatant lives through the use of this technology—if done 
correctly—and these efforts should not be prematurely terminated by a preemptive 
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ban.”133 Author Ronald Bailey furthers this thought on the ethical use of LAWS, by 
noting that “since self-preservation would not be their foremost drive, they would refrain 
from firing in uncertain situations. Not burdened with emotions, autonomous weapons 
would avoid the moral snares of anger and frustration. They could objectively weigh 
information and avoid confirmation bias when making targeting and firing decisions.”134 
Both proponents and opponents raise concerns regarding the applicability of international 
humanitarian law to LAWS and it is perhaps the most difficult concern to address by 
those developing the technology. 
 
Chapter Summary 
The issues that surround establishing common understanding on LAWS 
emphasized above, are the basis for much of the initial debate between proponents and 
opponents at the UN CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS. In trying to reach some 
semblance of commonality, the importance of defining LAWS, autonomy, and 
meaningful human control is paramount in order to move forward on any meaningful 
efforts to ban LAWS. Yet the debate over exactly what systems are being addressed, how 
autonomy should be categorized, what issues are driving increased autonomy, the role of 
meaningful human control in those systems, and concerns over international law are all 
debates worth having. While these debates focus on systems that do not (and indeed may 
not ever) exist, they are based on and informed by their precursors, unmanned systems, 
and by previous attempts at international arms control. 
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BACKGROUND: UNMANNED SYSTEMS 
 
Although the U.S. government treats LAWS and the current plethora of unmanned 
systems as wholly different systems, the development of LAWS has a grounded basis in 
the past, present, and future of unmanned systems.135 The research in this chapter 
originated from a research project on unmanned systems conducted by the author for a 
Missouri State University class entitled Regional Security in the Greater Middle East, 
with portions of the original paper featured throughout. While the history of unmanned 
systems can perhaps be traced back several decades, it is only within the last decade or so 
that the systems have risen to an early level of prominence in warfare and, barring some 
radically new technological breakthrough, they are likely to continue to ascend in 
importance in the near future. As an early adopter of unmanned systems, the U.S. military 
has developed and deployed a wide range of unmanned systems across land, air, and sea 
operating domains to perform a variety of mission sets, some of which are lethal. There 
also exists a burgeoning international market for unmanned systems, particularly 
weaponized ones, which is helping drive the quest for greater levels of autonomy in 
unmanned systems. Although weaponized unmanned systems make up only a small 
portion of the U.S. military’s unmanned system fleet, the public perception of ‘drone 
strikes’ and ‘drone warfare’ has colored domestic and international views of the role of 
unmanned systems in warfare. In the debates before the UN CCW Meeting of Experts on 
LAWS the perceptions held by many parties can perhaps be traced to their unique 
experience with unmanned systems. 
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Unmanned Systems Terminology 
In order to expound on unmanned systems as the precursors to LAWS, it is 
important to first clarify exactly what is meant by unmanned systems and how they differ 
from manned systems. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology defines 
an “unmanned system” as “a powered physical system, with no human operator aboard 
the principal components, which acts in the physical world to accomplish assigned tasks. 
It may be mobile or stationary. It can include any and all associated supporting 
components such as operator control units (OCU). Examples include unmanned ground 
vehicles (UGV), unmanned aerial vehicles/systems (UAV/UAS), unmanned maritime 
vehicles (UMV)--unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) or unmanned water surface 
borne vehicles (USV)--unattended munitions (UM), and unattended ground sensors 
(UGS). Missiles, rockets, and their submunitions, and artillery are not considered the 
principal components of UMSs.”136 The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
definition is used by both the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) and the 
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and 
includes unattended munitions and ground sensors within its definition.  
The U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) Unmanned Systems Integrated 
Roadmap of both FY2011 and FY2013 also use the term “unmanned system,” but do not 
define it, instead breaking it down into “unmanned aircraft systems,” “unmanned ground 
systems,” and “unmanned maritime systems,” and then defining those.137 The DoD 
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Directive 3000.09 entitled Autonomy in Weapon Systems from the Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and signed by then Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Ash Carter, uses the term “unmanned platform” and defines it simply as “an air, land, 
surface, subsurface, or space platform that does not have the human operator physically 
onboard the platform.”138 The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms does not include or define unmanned systems at all, instead only 
offering definitions for “unmanned aircraft” (UA) and “UAS.”139 
As an example, the lack of cohesive terminology on unmanned systems, even 
within DoD, is endemic of the larger problem with defining LAWS because the 
combination of terms using “unmanned” and “system” are used to describe both a vehicle 
and an entire system of vehicle, equipment, network, and personnel. Then there’s the 
platform, which has long been a dubiously used term, one that could be used to denote a 
variety of meanings, including a single vehicle, a fleet of vehicles, or the system of 
vehicle, equipment, network, and personnel. For the purpose of this paper, we will use 
National Institute of Standards and Technology’s definition for “unmanned systems,” 
because it generally covers most of the factors that differentiate unmanned systems from 
traditional manned systems and covers the breakup among unmanned systems. We will 
also abbreviate unmanned vehicle(s) as (UxV) and unmanned system(s) as (UxS). This 
offers a terminology distinction between vehicles and systems, with UxV used to describe 
the actual vehicle; UxS to describe the system of vehicle, equipment, network, and 
personnel; and allows the ‘x’ to be replaced with the operating domain of the unmanned 
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vehicle or system.  
In clarifying unmanned systems, it is important to differentiate them from both 
traditional manned vehicles and various iterations of smart weapons and munitions, in-
order to recognize the qualitatively different challenges they pose. The obvious and key 
difference between an unmanned system and any traditional manned vehicle or system, is 
that an unmanned system does not physically have the operator onboard the vehicle, 
implying a lack of physical threat to the operator in operating the vehicle. Yet it can be 
somewhat difficult to the casual observer to define, for example, exactly what differences 
exist between an UAV and current 'smart' missile technology.140 The primary 
differentiating factor, is simply that an UxV is designed to be reused or recovered, but 
that a smart munition is designed to be expendable.  
While this factor generally holds true, there currently exists a bit of a grey area 
when an UxV is designed to be expendable, either because recovery is not desirable, 
possible, or intended, particularly for an UxV used to self-destruct on a target. The Israeli 
Orbiter 1K is a great example, in that it carries a 2.2kg warhead and can be used to self-
destruct on impact with light vehicles, but is also used as a traditional ISR platform and 
can be recovered and reused should no suitable target be identified.141 The Orbiter 1K and 
other systems like it are usually considered loitering munitions, but act quite similarly to 
UAVs, which only serves to muddy the waters further to the casual observer. The use of 
the NIST's definition allows us to skirt the argument of reusability because it does not 
include the factor at all. The NIST definition also clearly states that “missiles, rockets, 
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and their submunitions, and artillery are not considered unmanned systems.”142 While the 
decision to not include these munitions within the NIST definition is not well defined, it 
is likely an argument of reuse. 
While we will consider unattended munitions to some extent, there is relatively 
little benefit in pursuing a line on unattended ground sensors in discussing LAWS. 
Unattended ground sensors can be generally defined as a system encompassing a variety 
of interconnected sensing devices that may utilize seismic, acoustic, magnetic, 
pyroelectric, or imaging sensors to autonomously detect and report on presence or 
movement in a specific area.143 By definition, there is no reason to utilize unattended 
ground sensors in our discussion because they distinctly lack a weapon as part of the 
system, lethal or not. Unfortunately, unattended munition is a difficult term to work with 
because there exists no real definition for what exactly it encompasses. Unattended 
munitions can be generally defined as a munition that is designed to be unaccompanied or 
not be watched, but there is scarce little more to go on.144 As such, there will be scant 
discussion on unattended munitions in this chapter. 
Next, we must tackle what terms and differences exist between the wide array of 
unmanned systems. UxV and UxS are typically defined along lines based on the 
operating domains of aerial, ground, maritime, and space, but can also be broken down 
based on vehicle type, position within the operating domain, maneuverability, and level 
of autonomy. 
In the aerial operating domain, the most commonly used term is the UAV which is 
defined by the DoD as a “powered, aerial vehicles that do not carry a human operator, use 
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aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, 
can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Ballistic or 
semi ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered 
unmanned aerial vehicles.”145 More recently the U.S. government (and by extension the 
DoD) has moved to use the terms UA and UAS as originally laid out in the DoD 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030.146 The roadmap definitions are used in 
the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, which defines an “unmanned 
aircraft” as “an aircraft that does not carry a human operator and is capable of flight with 
or without human remote control,” and an “unmanned aircraft system” as “that system 
whose components include the necessary equipment, network, and personnel to control 
an unmanned aircraft.”147 While UA and UAS have become an accepted standard to 
replace UAV across both the DoD and the whole of the U.S. government, the paper will 
use all three terms and definitions (UAV, UA, and UAS) in discussion of unmanned 
systems in the aerial operating domain. 
For the ground operating domain, the term “unmanned ground vehicle” (UGV) is 
frequently used, which is defined by the DoD as “a powered, mobile, ground conveyance 
that does not have a human aboard; it can be operated in one or more modes of control 
(autonomous, semiautonomous, teleoperation, remote control); it can be expendable or 
recoverable; and it can have lethal or non-lethal mission modules.”148 More recently the 
DoD has begun using the term “unmanned ground system” (UGS), which is defined in 
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the Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038 as “a powered physical 
system with (optionally) no human operator aboard the principal platform, which can act 
remotely to accomplish assigned tasks. UGS may be mobile or stationary, can be smart 
learning and self-adaptive, and include all associated supporting components such as 
operator control units.”149 With both UGV and UGS being the standard terms used in the 
DoD, the paper will use the terms and definitions in discussion of unmanned systems in 
the ground operating domain. 
In the maritime operating domain, there are two types of UxV, USV and UUV, 
which are part of an “unmanned maritime system” (UMS). The DoD defines both USV 
and UUV in the Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036, defining USV as 
vehicles “that operate with near-continuous contact with the surface of the water, 
including conventional hull crafts, hydrofoils, and semi-submersibles” and UUV as 
vehicles “made to operate without necessary contact with the surface (but may need to be 
near surface for communications purposes) and some can operate covertly.”150 The DoD 
goes on to define UMS as “unmanned vehicles that displace water at rest,” but also that it 
comprises “all necessary support components, and the fully integrated sensors and 
payloads necessary to accomplish the required missions.”151 For the purpose of the paper, 
we will use the terms and definitions for USV, UUV, and UMS, in our discussion of 
unmanned systems in the maritime operating domain. 
In regards to the space operating domain, there has been no shortage of the use of 
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unmanned spacecraft within the domain and they can be simply defined as a vehicle or 
machine without a human operator on-board designed to achieve spaceflight. The Treaty 
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) is regarded 
as the basic legal framework for international actions in space and while it precludes the 
deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space, it does not ban conventional 
weapons, which has been a subject of debate among both spacefaring and non-
spacefaring nations.152 While there exists a rapidly increasing number and variety of 
unmanned spacecraft in various levels of space, there are currently no known weapons 
within space or within Earth's orbit, though it remains quite technically feasible. Because 
the focus of this paper is on LAWS, it is difficult to discuss at great length on an 
operating domain that does not currently have weaponized unmanned systems within it, 
though it is certainly possible that they may one day exist. 
Finally, regarding the popularly used term “drone,” the term was originally a 
nickname given by troops training against unmanned aerial targets in World War II 
because of the 'droning' sound that the target aircraft engines made when they flew by at a 
controlled constant speed.153 Over the years the nickname has become something of a 
popular, albeit overly simplified, catchall term, that is synonymously used for unmanned 
vehicles across every operating domain, weaponized or not. While the term drone may 
often be used synonymously for unmanned systems within the popular lexicon, the term 
should not be considered synonymous with LAWS because of the distinct differences 
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over autonomy. 
 
A Brief History of Unmanned Systems  
In order for us to address the current state of unmanned systems and the 
implications of their use in warfare, we must briefly discuss the history of unmanned 
systems (particularly U.S. development) to grasp the extent of their evolution in a 
relatively short period of time, which amplifies the concerns over LAWS. It is difficult to 
pin down exactly when or what the earliest example of an unmanned system would be, 
weaponized or not. If we are to use the NIST definition of unmanned systems as our 
baseline, that means that an unmanned system would need to be “a powered physical 
system, with no human operator aboard the principal components, which acts in the 
physical world to accomplish assigned tasks,” that could “be mobile or stationary.”154 We 
must also be mindful of the categories included in the NIST's definition and those 
systems and categories specifically not considered unmanned systems, namely “missiles, 
rockets, and their sub-munitions, and artillery.”155 
The first requisite, that an unmanned system be a powered system, precludes any 
potential unmanned systems that predates the use of electromechanical systems. Although 
various forms of automata had been designed and built over the centuries in Europe and 
Asia, they were not electromechanical systems, which only began to appear in increasing 
number during the 19th century. Some historians point to the use of unmanned hot-air 
balloons loaded with small bombs by the Austrians against Venice in 1849 and to patents 
filed in the U.S. for similar devices during the 1860s, as the earliest possible weaponized 
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unmanned systems.156 Still others point to advancements made in remotely controlled 
torpedoes and boats, such as the Brennan torpedo and Nikola Tesla's wireless boat, as a 
potential starting point. The problem with these suggestions and others like them, is that 
it is difficult to discern whether these potential early unmanned systems actually meet all 
(or indeed any) of the metrics in the NIST definition. Indeed, most of the early systems 
suggested are more accurately defined in the systems specifically not considered 
unmanned systems. 
It is more generally accepted that some of what could be considered early 
unmanned systems were invented during World War I, particularly weaponized ones. 
Inventions like the American Kettering Bug, the German FL-Boat, and the American 
Wickersham Land Torpedo, could be considered some of the earliest unmanned systems 
that might meet the criteria of the NIST definition, yet these inventions are also difficult 
to accept wholly in relation to our definition. The Kettering Bug, was a biplane with most 
of the body replaced by explosives that flew to its target based on a mechanical system 
that would count engine revolutions before dropping out of the sky, which had more in 
common with and is considered a forerunner of the modern cruise missile.157 The 
Germans produced a series of remotely controlled boats laden with explosives called the 
FL-Boat (Fernlenkboot), which managed at least one confirmed hit (the HMS Erebus) 
during the war, but arguably had as much in common with a traditional torpedo as an 
unmanned system.158 The Wickersham Land Torpedo, a small tracked vehicle strapped 
                                                 
156Russell Naughton, “Remote Piloted Aerial Vehicles,” Monash University, February 02, 2003, 
http://www.ctie.monash.edu/hargrave/rpav_home.html#Beginnings. 
157Jimmy Stamp, “Unmanned Drones Have Been Around Since World War I,” Smithsonian, February 12, 
2013, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/unmanned-drones-have-been-around-since-world-war-
i-16055939/?no-ist. 
158 Wilson Rothman, “Unmanned Warbots of WWI and WWII,” Gizmodo, March 24, 2009, 
http://gizmodo.com/5181576/unmanned-warbots-of-wwi-and-wwii. 
 47 
with explosives and remotely controlled, was never even produced, which greatly 
diminishes its potential impact on unmanned systems.159 While these inventions may also 
be somewhat difficult to determine whether they meet all of the requisites laid out in the 
NIST definition or not, they definitely served as grounds for the further development of 
unmanned systems. 
During the interwar period limited experimentation with early unmanned systems 
continued, with both the British and American navies testing the use of radio controlled 
airplanes as targets for ship defense batteries with relative success in limited numbers.160 
The U.S. Naval Research Laboratory managed to fly a radio controlled Curtis F-5L 
through all phases of flight in 1924 and in 1935 the British began converting de 
Havilland Tiger Moth biplanes into radio controlled targets known as Queen Bees.161 
However it was the advent of World War II that fueled renewed interest in unmanned 
systems, as both sides sought wonder weapons to help get a leg up in the conflict.  
The U.S. Army Air Forces and Navy experimented with the aerial torpedo concept 
by way of radio controlled bombers loaded with explosives in the unsuccessful 
Operations Aphrodite and Anvil.162 The operations ground to a halt after they claimed the 
lives of several crews in accidents during early tests, most notable being pilot Joseph P. 
Kennedy Jr., elder brother of future U.S. President John F. Kennedy. During the 1930s 
and early 1940s the USSR developed and deployed Teletanks, mostly T-26s armed with 
flamethrowers modified for remote control, in the Winter War and the early phase of 
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Operation Barbarossa in limited numbers.163 The Radioplane OQ-2 became the first 
mass-produced unmanned system, with both the U.S. Army and Navy purchasing some 
15,000 of the radio controlled target planes for training antiaircraft gunners.164 Beginning 
in 1942 the Germans deployed several thousand Goliath tracked mines, a foot-tall remote 
controlled ground vehicle loaded with explosives designed to demolish enemy armor and 
structures, that was considered an operational failure due to high cost, poor operating 
capability, and susceptibility to a wide range of countermeasures.165 Although the 
German V-weapons (Vergeltungswaffen) are not considered unmanned systems because 
of their status as missiles, it is undeniable that the lessons learned in their development 
played a role in the development of unmanned systems in the early years of the Cold War. 
Development of unmanned systems continued during the early years of the Cold 
War, primarily to address the issue of accessibility for manned systems in ‘undesirable’ 
locations. During the late 1940s and early 1950s the U.S. Air Force flew radio controlled 
B-17s into the mushroom clouds of nuclear detonations to collect data on radioactivity.166 
In the 1960s and 1970s the Air Force also converted one of the most widely used 
unmanned targets, the jet-propelled Ryan Firebee, into an unmanned reconnaissance 
aircraft called the Lightning Bug, which were used during the Vietnam War to overfly 
areas considered too hostile for manned aircraft and then recovered when they parachuted 
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back to earth.167 During the early 1960s the U.S. Navy purchased several hundred 
Gyrodyne QH-50 Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopters (known as DASH) to provide anti-
sub capabilities on ships too small for regular helicopters to operate from.168 Around the 
same time period UUVs, either remotely piloted or autonomous in nature, were 
experimented with and developed by both government and private organizations to study 
the ocean (University of Washington’s SPURV)169 and facilitate undersea recovery (U.S. 
Navy’s CURV).170 Development of UGVs was limited during the Cold War, largely due 
to a lack of military interest, with most systems largely relegated to laboratory testing like 
the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Shakey the Robot and 
Autonomous Land Vehicle project.171 
While the U.S. was not the only country to develop and deploy unmanned 
systems during this time period of the Cold War, there is unfortunately less readily 
available data on other countries’ attempts at unmanned systems. The USSR developed 
and deployed (though it is unknown if they were ever used) several jet-propelled 
unmanned reconnaissance aircraft between the 1960s-1980s, such as the Tupolev Tu-123, 
Tu-141, and Tu-143, that operated much like the U.S. Air Force Lightning Bee and the 
cancelled Lockheed D-21.172 The People’s Republic of China is thought to have reverse 
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engineered the USSR’s Lavochkin LA-17 target aircraft to produce its own Nanjing CK-1 
target aircraft in the 1960s.173  
Although the U.S., USSR, and PRC would continue the development of 
unmanned systems during the 1970s and early 1980s, it is the Israeli experience with 
UAVs that led to a revival of interest in and helped define the modern use of unmanned 
systems in warfare. The Israeli heavy loss of aircraft to Egyptian Soviet supplied 
advanced anti-air systems during the War of Attrition led the Israeli government to 
consider the use of unmanned systems in the early 1970s. During the Yom Kippur War in 
1973, the Israelis launched numerous Northrop BQM-74 Chukar aerial targets at Syrian 
anti-air batteries in the Golan Heights, causing the Syrians to think an airstrike was 
underway and fire upon the Chukars, revealing their position and depleting their 
ammunition.174 The Israelis also launched several Ryan Firebees modified for 
reconnaissance on flights over the Sinai, that despite heavy losses, were considered 
successful.175 These successes in the Yom Kippur War and the desire for ‘over-the-hill’ 
reconnaissance led to the development of the Tadiran Mastiff, considered the first modern 
surveillance UAV, which combined a live video feed and loitering capability over a target 
area for an extended period of time.176 Israeli use of UAVs during the 1982 Lebanon War 
led to the spotting and neutralization of Syrian anti-air positions and manned aircraft 
without the loss of a single Israeli manned aircraft, dramatically changing military 
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perceptions of unmanned systems from R&D novelty to potential battlefield mainstay.177 
In the 1980s and 1990s technologies applicable to unmanned systems began to 
mature, allowing new and more robust systems to be developed and deployed in 
battlefield situations. In the mid-1980s the U.S. Navy and Army procured several Israeli 
AAI RQ-2 Pioneers to test the capability of commanders having access to real-time 
spotting to direct and assess target damage from ship batteries.178 The Pioneers allowed 
the U.S. Navy to have at least one UAV airborne throughout the entirety of operations in 
the Persian Gulf War, one of which the Iraqi defenders of Faylaka Island near Kuwait 
City attempted to surrender to, fearing an imminent artillery barrage.179 The success of 
the Pioneers and the efforts of joint CIA-Pentagon development projects led to the 
production of the iconic General Atomics MQ-1 Predator, which first saw use with NATO 
forces in the Yugoslav Wars in the mid-1990s.180  
The early 2000s and the War on Terror brought a sharp increase in the variety and 
number of UAVs used by the U.S. military, with UAVs being allocated for intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions at the strategic (RQ-4 Global Hawk), 
operational (MQ-1 Predator), and tactical (RQ-11 Raven) levels.181 The War on Terror 
also led to the development of armed UAVs, with the first credited kill taking place in 
October of 2001, ushering in the highly controversial tactics of “drone warfare” that have 
occupied the discourse on unmanned systems ever since.182 During the early 2000s 
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military development of UGVs, UUVs, and USVs lagged behind development and 
deployment of UAVs, though some systems saw success. The War on Terror led to further 
development of UGVs like the Foster-Miller TALON for use in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and infantry reconnaissance.183 At 
the same time, USVs like the Israeli Rafael Protector184 and U.S. Navy’s Common 
Unmanned Surface Vessel (CUSV) 185 saw limited testing and deployment for force 
protection, ISR, and mine warfare operations. The cancelled overly ambitious U.S. Army 
Future Combat Systems modernization program of 2003-2009 included a range of UAVs 
and UGVs, along with loitering munitions and non-line-of-sight munitions.186 Today, 
development of unmanned systems is continuing at a rapid pace, with an ever increasing 
number of nation-states and non-state actors gaining access to and developing a wide 
array of unmanned systems. 
 
The U.S. Unmanned Fleet 
The U.S. government is thought to currently possess the largest inventory of 
unmanned systems in the world and is an undisputed leader in research, development, 
and deployment of new unmanned systems. Within the U.S. government the military 
owns the lion’s share of unmanned systems and is the primary driver of research and 
development into new unmanned systems, which is reflected in the historical 
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development of American unmanned systems. While the total number of unmanned 
systems within the U.S. military’s arsenal is unknown, there is estimated to be at least 
10,000 UAVs,187 some 7,000 UGSs, 188 along with what are likely between several dozens 
to a couple hundred UUVs and USVs in various stages of research, development, or 
deployment.  
Data from the U.S. DoD describes the military’s funding of unmanned systems 
across the enterprise from the 2014 Presidential Budget (PB14) by fiscal year, domain, 
and funding need (Table 1). Broken down along fiscal years, the amount of funding for 
unmanned systems in Table 1 peaked at $5.27 billion in FY2015 followed by a drop in 
overall funding to $4.92 billion in FY2016 and a partial recovery in FY2017 and FY2018 
to $4.7 billion and $4.86 billion respectively. While UAVs are set to receive the bulk of 
funding outlined in Table 1, to the total tune of $21.7 billion from FY2014 – FY2018, 
there is also a substantial increase in yearly funding for UGVs (from $13 million in 
FY2014 to $66 million in FY2018) and UUVs and USVs (from $330.2 million in 
FY2014 to $381.8 million in FY2018). Unmanned system funding in Table 1 is split 
among the funding needs of research, development, test and evaluation (RDTE), 
procurement (Proc), and operations and maintenance (OM), fluctuating depending on the 
fiscal year and domain of the system. Generally speaking, most of the funding in Table 1 
for unmanned systems from FY2014 – FY2018 is to be spent on procurement (total of 
$10.25 billion) over RDTE and OM, but for UUVs and USVs the OM funding ($900.2 
million) is actually greater than the procurement funding ($708.2 million). It is important 
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to remember that the roughly $4-6 billion yearly funding for unmanned systems as 
outlined in PB14 is a small part of the larger defense budget, $525 billion in FY2014 and 
$577 billion in FY2018 respectively.189 
 
Table 1. DoD unmanned systems funding ($ mil/PB14).190 
Domain FYDP 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
Air RDTE 1189.4 1674.0 1521.4 1189.4 1087.9 6662.2 
 Proc 1505.5 2010.2 1843.5 1870.7 2152.8 9382.7 
 OM 1080.9 1135.2 1102.7 1156.9 1178.5 5654.1 
Domain Total 3775.9 4819.4 4467.6 4217.0 4419.3 21699.1 
Ground RDTE 6.5 19.1 13.6 11.1 10.3 60.9 
 Proc 6.5 27.9 30.7 42.6 55.4 163.1 
 OM1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Domain Total 13.0 47.0 44.3 53.7 66.0 223.9 
Maritime RDTE 62.8 54.8 66.1 81.0 87.2 351.9 
 Proc 104.0 184.8 160.1 158.1 101.1 708.2 
 OM 163.4 170.3 182.4 190.5 193.6 900.2 
Domain Total 330.2 409.8 408.6 429.7 381.8 1960.2 
All RDTE 1258.7 1747.9 1601.1 1281.5 1185.7 7075.0 
 Proc 1616.0 2222.9 2034.3 2071.4 2309.3 10253.9 
 OM 1244.3 1305.4 1285.1 1347.4 1372.1 6554.3 
All Domains Total 4119.1 5276.2 4920.5 4700.4 4867.1 23883.2 
1 Ground OM is funded with overseas contingency operations funding. 
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As the largest type of unmanned systems in the U.S. military, UAVs and UAS 
incorporate an increasingly larger number and variety of systems across all branches. 
Because of the diffuse use of UAVs and the unique requirements required by each of the 
service branches, the DoD moved in 2010 to a “group system” for standardizing 
categorization of UAVs and UAS across the military enterprise.191 The UAS group 
system has five groups, with each group separated by maximum takeoff weight, normal 
operating altitude, and airspeed (Table 2). As noted in Table 2, the size, maximum takeoff 
weight, and normal operating altitude of a UAV typically increases as you move from 
Group 1 on the low end to Group 5 on the high end, while airspeed stops as an increasing 
categorical requirement at Group 3. 
 
Table 2. DoD UAS Group System.192 
UAS Group Maximum Weight 
(lbs.) 
Normal Operating 
Altitude (ft.) 
Airspeed (kts) 
Group 1 0-20 < 1,200 100 
Group 2 21-55 < 3,500 < 250 
Group 3 < 1,320 < 18,000 < 250 
Group 4 > 1,320 < 18,000 Any Airspeed 
Group 5 > 1,320 > 18,000 Any Airspeed 
 
The DoD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038 lists the number 
and type of UAV/UAS in the U.S. military (as of July 1, 2013) by UAS group and also 
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denotes what services are flying which systems (Figure 1). UAS Group 1 in Figure 1 
contains the majority of UAVs owned by the DoD (nearly 9,800), which are used by 
multiple services and are solely ISR UAVs. The group includes the RQ-11 Raven, WASP, 
Puma, and RQ-16 T-Hawk, which are typically considered hand-launched tactical UAVs 
used to support platoon level or smaller groups. There is only one UAV listed in UAS 
Group 2 in Figure 1, the ScanEagle, which is used by the Navy and Marine Corps and is a 
larger, catapult launched ISR system. UAS Group 3 in Figure 1 lists three UAVs, the RQ-
7 Shadow, an expeditionary UAS (the cancelled A160 Hummingbird), and a small 
tactical UAS (RQ-21 Blackjack), which are catapult launched (except for the A160) ISR 
UAVs. UAS Group 4 in Figure 1 begins a substantial departure from previous groups, 
containing three UAVs, the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Hunter, and MQ-8 Fire Scout. The 
UAVs in UAS Group 4 require a runway or cleared landing zone and can carry a suite of 
ISR sensors and kinetic armaments. The two UAVs in UAS Group 5 in Figure 1 are the 
MQ-9 Reaper and the RQ-4 Global Hawk, one a multi-role hunter-killer and the other a 
dedicated high-altitude ISR system, which require devoted runways for takeoff. 
The roadmap also lists current DoD deployment of UGV/UGS and the 
expectation of future development across the enterprise, defined by the mission or 
capability area that the system is intended to address (Figure 2). The systems exampled in 
Figure 2 make up the bulk of UGV in use by the U.S. military today, but also showcases 
the intended direction of near-term future capabilities that are being pursued to support 
the warfighter. Several of the systems listed are not new unmanned systems, but rather 
unmanned or automation capabilities being given to existing ground vehicle platforms. 
The ‘protection’ mission encompasses the capability areas of EOD, CBRN, protection, 
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and engineering, whose systems include current and follow-on procurements like the 
Foster-Miller TALON, the M160 Light Flail mine clearer, and the Husky Mounted 
Detection System. The ‘sustainment’ mission includes the capability areas of logistics 
and transport, which includes unmanned capability for the HMMWV and its replacement 
the JLTV, the FMTV series of transport vehicles, and the HMEE armored backhoe. The 
‘soldier’ mission contains the capability areas of ISR and command and control, that 
includes throwable UGVs like the FirstLook and Recon Scout and an interoperable 
universal controller for UGVs.  
 
 
Figure 1. Inventory of DoD UAS.193 
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Figure 2. UGS by Mission/Capability Area.194 
 
Additionally, the roadmap lists several USVs and UUVs undergoing development 
and deployment, that are defined by mission area and operating domain (Figure 3). The 
current development and deployment of USVs and UUVs as demonstrated in Figure 3, 
tend to focus on mine counter-measure and maritime security support to the Navy, with 
some systems (particularly UUVs) dipping into both mission areas. The mine counter-
measure and maritime security vessels referenced in Figure 3, such as the mine 
countermeasure USV (the U.S. Navy’s Common Unmanned Surface Vessel), the U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School’s Sea Fox Mk I and II, and the Modular Unmanned Surface 
Craft Littoral, are small craft that operate in the riverine or littoral zones in support of 
littoral combat ships (LCS), with fewer than a dozen total having been produced. Most of 
                                                 
194 Ibid, p. 7. 
 59 
the UUVs in Figure 3 are proof of concept (Pennsylvania State University’s Sea Stalker 
and Sea Maverick) or near-term future systems, though some are in use in limited 
numbers today, such as the Remote Mine-Hunting System and the MK18 Mod 1 
Swordfish and Mod 2 Kingfish. The dearth of operational UUVs is largely due to the lack 
of reliable navigation and communication capabilities, which is a problem that has 
plagued development and deployment of UUVs for decades.195 
 
 
Figure 3. UMS by Mission Area.196 
 
Despite the U.S. military having over 10,000 UAS alone and many more 
unmanned systems spread across the enterprise, only 200-300 are even capable of being 
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armed.197 While there are other unmanned systems being used and developed by other 
agencies within the U.S government, the amount of readily available information is 
limited. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is thought to possess a combination of 
roughly 30 MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper UAVs that are operated by the Air Force, 
though there is no way of verifying this number or how many are armed.198 The U.S. Air 
Force also operates the RQ-170 Sentinel for the CIA, which is thought to be a stealthy 
ISR UAV that was brought down over Iran in December 2011.199 Additionally, the U.S. 
Air Force assumed operation of the Boeing X-37 unmanned spacecraft from 
NASA/DARPA in 2004 and has flown at least four test flights over increasingly longer 
periods of time.200 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its Customs and 
Border Protection agency operate ISR UAVs for domestic law enforcement and have 
loaned their UAVs to other agencies at least 700 times within the period of 2010-2012.201 
These are but a few examples of the increasing number of unmanned systems in use by 
the U.S. government today. 
 
International Development and Proliferation 
In addition to the U.S. development of unmanned systems, there has been an 
explosion in development and production internationally of both unarmed and 
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weaponized systems, following in the wake of the U.S. use of UAVs over the last decade 
and a half. This growth is largely being driven by a burgeoning UAV market that has 
reached the converging point between technology and accessibility, as UAVs have 
become affordable, with off-the-shelf availability, and a low enough barrier to entry 
technologically, that they are being bought by individuals, industry, and governments 
alike. This rate of widespread proliferation only really currently applies to UAVs, as the 
deployment of UGVs, UUVs, and USVs are still fairly limited even within advanced 
nation-state militaries. While unmanned systems present an attractive and promising 
future to the benefit of mankind, their rapid and unchecked proliferation may lead to 
some very undesirable consequences. 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimates that within a decade the 
global UAV market will constitute a $90 billion industry.202 In 2014 the Consumer 
Electronic Association forecasted domestic private UAV sales to be over $84 million and 
250,000 units.203 By 2015, domestic private UAV sales were $261 million and nearly 1 
million units sold.204 Domestic private sales in 2016 are estimated to grow another 84%, 
to $481 million and roughly 2.5 million units.205 By mid-March of 2016, over 408,000 
private users had registered their UAVs as part of the FAA’s ruling to monitor UAV use, 
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which leaves hundreds of thousands of UAVs in the U.S. still unregistered.206  
Not to be outdone by private buyers, the FAA estimates that in 2017 nearly 2.5 
million UAVs will be sold for commercial use alone, as Congress and FAA regulations 
open up to allow more commercial drone operator licenses.207 The global commercial 
UAV market will grow by a compound annual growth rate of 19% over the next five 
years, driven largely by a handful of industries such as agriculture, photography, and 
utilities.208 But the U.S. is lagging behind other countries and regions in the commercial 
and industrial application of UAVs, due to the slow adaptability of domestic regulations. 
Countries like China, Israel, Japan, Brazil, and the EU are all pushing for the rapid 
inclusion of UAVs into their national airspaces for commercial and industrial use.209 DJI, 
one of the world’s largest UAV manufacturers based in China, was valued at $10 billion 
in 2015 and was expected to generate nearly $1 billion in sales alone in 2015.210 China 
UAV exports in 2015 were valued at over $413 million and the country claims over 400 
different drone manufacturers.211 While there is comparatively little detailed data on the 
state of the international market, the size and growth of the U.S. domestic market should 
be an indicator of the trend of global UAV markets. 
At the same time, the global proliferation of UAVs, both unarmed and armed, for 
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military use has also risen, although not as dramatically as the private market. In 2005 
there were 41 states with complete UAS, which grew to 76 in 2012; in the same time 
frame, the total number of UAV programs worldwide grew from 195 to over 900.212 
Today there are 86 nation-states with UAV programs, of which only seven have used 
armed drones in combat, but four other states have demonstrated an armed capability and 
an additional ten are developing or purchasing armed drones.213 Between 2010 and 2014 
there were 439 UAVs sold to 35 nation-states, of which only 11 UAVs (2.5% of the total) 
were armed.214 Israel led exports of UAVs during the 2010-2014 time frame at 165, with 
the U.S. in second at 132, followed distantly by Italy in third at 37.215  
UAVs also provide violent non-state actors with potential capabilities that could 
be easily utilized if they had access to UAVs, armed or not. The characteristics that define 
the popularity of UAVs, small, cheap, and readily available make the variety of 
possibilities for their use by non-state actors numerous. Suicide attacks, assassinations, 
dispersal of chemical or biological agents, attacks on airliners, attacks on transportation 
or power infrastructure, and dispersal of agents over crops, livestock, or water supplies 
are but a few examples of ways a terrorist could attack a military or civilian target via 
UAV. Hamas has experimented with UAVs over several years, most recently in the 2014 
Israel-Gaza Conflict, with very limited success, but the group claims to have UAVs 
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armed with rockets and suicide devices that operate like a missile. 216 In August 2014, 
ISIL released video footage from a UAV that it was using to monitor military troop 
movements in Syria and Iraq.217 Hezbollah used Iranian supplied UAVs armed with 40-
50 kg explosive warheads in its 2006 and 2012 wars with Israel, flew a UAV near the 
Dimona nuclear complex in April 2013, and has flown several UAVs into Israel to probe 
air defense reaction times. 218 In September 2013 Hezbollah used an armed UAV to attack 
an al-Nusra Front compound in Syria.219 Greater use of UAVs by non-state actors may 
only be restricted by current technical limitations, though certainly not for a lack of 
imagination in trying to use them. 
Another major concern of the global proliferation of UAVs is their intersection 
with traditional manned systems in national and international airspaces. The FAA 
recorded 236 incidents, sightings, or close calls between manned aircraft and UAVs in 
2014, which jumped to more than 1,200 incidents in 2015.220 There were 327 ‘proximity 
danger’ incidents between December 2013 and September 2015, which meant that a UAV 
came within 500 feet of a manned aircraft.221 Of those 327 incidents, 51 of them involved 
a UAV coming within 50 feet or less of a manned aircraft, with 28 incidents forcing the 
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piloted aircraft to maneuver to avoid collision with the UAV.222 In comparison, there is 
currently no known group monitoring UAV incidents at an international level, though 
they are likely numerous as well. 
While nowhere near as developed as UAVs, there are other unmanned systems 
being deployed and marketed abroad. The modular Israeli Guardium UGV has been used 
to guard remote areas of the Sinai, airports, and other high value civilian targets since 
2008.223 Russia has recently developed at least two UGVs, the Taifun-M Armored 
Reconnaissance Vehicle used for ICBM silo security224 and the Uran-9 mini-tank which 
is designed for reconnaissance and fire support to manned systems.225 In early April 2016 
an Israeli Harop loitering munition was used by Azerbaijani forces in the ongoing dispute 
with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, one of several hundred supposedly sold according 
to manufacturer IAI.226 South Korean defense firm DoDaam Systems has built an 
automated .50 caliber stationary turret, the Super Aegis II, which is deployed along the 
demilitarized zone with North Korea and at numerous locations in the Middle East.227 
These examples of the international development and deployment of unmanned systems, 
are likely to play a continuing role in the debate over LAWS. 
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The Efficacy of Drone Warfare 
In the aftermath of the horrors unleashed by 19 hijackers armed with simple 
weapons on 11 September 2001, the U.S. launched headlong into the fray of the War on 
Terror, a conflict markedly different from any it had previously waged, against an enemy 
it little understood and was scant prepared for fighting. As months changed into years 
after the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A) on October 7, 
2001, it became increasingly apparent that the conventional conflict in Afghanistan was 
reaching the limits of its effectiveness. The terrorists that the U.S. was engaged with 
moved across international borders, lived within remote and inhospitable areas, and hid 
among civilian populations for long periods of time, not interested in staying boxed 
within or adhering to a traditional neat little conflict zone. The U.S. quickly needed a new 
set of tactics for dealing with the unique parameters of the conflict and turned to recent 
developments in weaponizing UAVs to meet the challenge. In the years since the first 
credited ‘kill' by an American UAV in October of 2001, there has been an enduring 
debate on a multitude of aspects of the popularly termed “drone warfare.” Although it has 
long been the U.S. government's stance to generally deny the specifics of a policy of 
“targeted killing” by “drone strike,” it is perhaps one of the worst kept secrets of the War 
on Terror and has been a hotly contested issue for more than a decade.  
The issue of drone warfare has repeatedly raised the question of its efficacy to 
meet desired U.S. goals in both the short and long term, which can be further echoed in 
the debate over LAWS. As the perceived precursor to LAWS, how weaponized UAVs 
have been and are being used has had a direct impact in the discourse of the UN CCW 
Meeting of Experts on LAWS. With various facts and opinions on weaponized UAVs and 
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drone warfare being utilized as the basis to debate a prohibition on LAWS, it is 
imperative that the efficacy of the program also be considered in the discussion. In asking 
the question of efficacy however, it is important to define what the desired result is. The 
program of targeted killings, mostly by armed UAVs, has been used by both the Bush and 
Obama administrations as a key tool of U.S. counterterrorism policy in the War on Terror, 
which suggests that the efficacy of drone warfare should be whether or not it meets the 
goals of U.S. counterterrorism policy.228  
So what then are the goals of U.S. counterterrorism policy? According to the 
Obama administration's 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the overarching 
goals of U.S. counterterrorism policy are:229 
 Protecting our homeland by constantly reducing our vulnerabilities and 
adapting and updating our defenses. 
 Disrupting, degrading, dismantling and defeating al-Qa’ida wherever it takes 
root. 
 Preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing weapons of mass 
destruction. 
 Eliminating the safehavens al-Qa’ida needs to train, plot and launch attacks 
against us. 
 Degrading links between al-Qa’ida, its affiliates and adherents. 
 Countering al-Qa’ida ideology and its attempts to justify violence. 
 Depriving al-Qa’ida and its affiliates of their enabling means, including illicit 
financing, logistical support, and online communications. 
The goals outlined by the Obama administration are similar, but somewhat different from 
the Bush administration's goals in the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: 
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“defeat terrorists and their organizations; deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to 
terrorists; diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; defend U.S. 
citizens and interests at home and abroad.” 230 
In-order to determine the efficacy of U.S. drone policy, we must at a minimum 
consider the goals and objectives of U.S. counterterrorism policy, of which drone strikes 
are one select tool from the toolbox. But can or should the efficacy of drone warfare be 
based solely on its capability to meet the goals of U.S. counterterrorism policy? Perhaps 
in a truly isolated sociopolitical vacuum this would be the case, but international affairs, 
particularly in the Bush administration termed “Greater Middle East” where drone strikes 
are being utilized, are anything but. Maybe the efficacy of drone warfare should be 
extended to include U.S. foreign policy goals or possibly U.S. national security goals? 
Perhaps we should include considerations of the alternatives to reach the same objectives, 
such as the potential risk to our own forces, economic value, and the total impact on 
civilians and civilian property? Indeed, the debate over efficacy could be expanded to 
include as many other goals, objectives, and considerations as one sees fit, enabling a 
never ending argument over the efficacy of drone warfare. That debate is worthy of an 
entire paper all itself, but for the purpose of this paper we will generally gauge the 
efficacy of drone warfare based on knowable statistics and U.S. counterterrorism goals 
and objectives, while also noting general concerns about U.S. policy goals at large. In 
doing so, the paper will examine the efficacy on both a country-by-country basis and for 
the greater whole. 
The current U.S. drone warfare program can be split into one program managed 
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by the U.S. military, which has jurisdiction for battlefield UAV use, and another by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which manages covert drone operations in non-
declared battlefield spaces. As the use and reliance upon UAVs, particularly weaponized 
ones, expanded during the 2000s and into this decade, so too did the number of UAVs in 
the U.S. arsenal. When the War on Terror began in 2001, the U.S. only had some 50 
UAVs, but today the U.S. fleet contains over 10,000.231 In 2005 UAVs only accounted for 
5% of U.S. military aircraft, but by 2012 UAVs accounted for over 31% and the number 
has only continued to grow.232 As the number of UAVs increased, so too did their usage, 
from 10,000 flight hours in 2005, to 550,000 flight hours in 2010.233 The budget for 
procurement and development of UAVs has also increased dramatically, while the 
military investment in FY2001 was around $667 million, it ballooned to $3.9 billion in 
FY2012.234 U.S. UAV fleet growth is also the law; in 2000 the U.S. Congress mandated 
the goal of making UAVs account for a third of the U.S. Air Force's (USAF) deep strike 
force operations aircraft.235 
As a battlefield tactic, drone strikes are not altogether different from an airstrike 
from a traditional aircraft, but there are a few differences that, along with the way the 
tactic is being used in non-declared battlefields, is cause for vilification by opponents. By 
design, UAVs allow a platform to remain on target anywhere from 15-25 hours, 
compared with 4-6 hours for an F-16 fighter jet, all the while not placing pilots or ground 
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forces in harm’s way over hostile territory.236 Additionally, armed UAVs can provide a 
near-instantaneous response to a targeting opportunity, compared with the time required 
to bring assets to bear against a target from either support aircraft or cruise missile 
launches from ships and submarines. The AGM-114 Hellfire missile, the weapon found in 
most armed UAV payloads, has a limited collateral damage spread, as it is an anti-tank 
missile, which is designed for penetration power instead of large explosions and shrapnel. 
The Hellfire missile moves faster than the speed of sound, which from 30,000 feet can 
impact a target within seconds, often before it is heard on the ground or before target 
environment conditions change.237 
Yet for all the pros supporting the use of UAVs compared with other strike 
capabilities, it is the way drone strikes are being used that draws the most ire. UAVs are 
like any other strike platform, in that they rely upon intelligence sources for target 
acquisition, but the operating environment of most UAV targets are not conductive for 
thorough target screening. This has led to a tactic known as “signature strikes,” which 
selects targets based upon a behavior pattern matrix of actions, location, and timing to 
determine if a target is valid, without the use of corroborative intelligence.238 Another 
employed tactic, has been the use of “double-tap strikes,” which targets those who enter 
the target area after an initial strike, on the assumption that any would be rescuers are 
fellow terrorists.239 Additional targets have also been selected based around attendance to 
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mosques, funerals, or community gatherings with known targets.240 While drone strikes 
were originally credited as being an effective tactic against High Value Targets (HVTs), 
they are increasingly being used against targets with low or questionable value, often 
with no known terrorist connection.241 
In discussing the issue of drone strikes, it is important to caveat much of the data 
surrounding the discussion. The Obama administration only recently published a short 
three-page report on 1 July 2016 that briefly summarizes “U.S. Counterterrorism Strikes 
Outside Areas of Active Hostilities;” one of the few official disclosures of relevant 
data.242 According to the report, between 20 January 2009 and 31 December 2015 the U.S. 
carried out 473 strikes, which killed 2,372-2,581 combatants and 64-116 non-
combatants.243 The report offers few distinctions, as it does not define which 
organizations of the “U.S. government” carried out the strikes, whether the “strikes” 
included only drone strikes or both drone strikes and more conventional strikes, whom or 
what encompasses the broadly defined “terrorist targets,” and only notes the “areas of 
active hostilities,” Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, but not where the “strikes outside areas 
of active hostilities” took place.244 
Because so little official data exists on drone strikes, a number of 
nongovernmental organizations, journalists, news agencies, and other secondary sources 
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have filled the vacuum with data sets that have been acquired from a wide range of 
sources. These secondary sources include the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, New 
America, and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, among other groups and 
organizations. Because of the nature of the drone strike program, the reporting area, the 
individuals and groups targeted, differences in definitions, and the range of sources of 
data, it is extremely difficult for groups to determine accurate counts of drone strikes and 
casualties.245 As such, there exists discrepancies between reporting groups and the U.S. 
government and between the reporting groups themselves, and while the paper attempts 
to examine multiple data sources and data ranges in the following discussion, it is salient 
to remember the limitations that such data affords in lieu of official data. 
While the use of drone strikes in the War on Terror began under President George 
W. Bush, they are considered a signature hallmark of President Barack Obama's 
administration. Under President Bush, the CIA or U.S. military reportedly carried out 51 
strikes in Pakistan that killed 377-558 people, 246 one strike in Yemen that killed six,247 
and an unknown number in Afghanistan and Iraq. Under President Obama, the CIA or 
U.S. military have reportedly carried out at least 370 strikes in Pakistan that have killed 
1905-3063 people, 248 106 strikes in Yemen that have killed 492-725,249 17 strikes in 
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Somalia that have killed 33-121 people,250 105 strikes in Libya,251 1,015 strikes in 
Afghanistan,252 and 48 in Iraq.253 Drone strikes by UAVs have enjoyed a bipartisan 
popularity in both U.S. public opinion polls and in the U.S. Congress, with 58% of 
Americans approving of their use and a majority approval among both political parties.254 
Yet that same approval is not shared in much of the rest of the world and in particular in 
the Greater Middle East, which has an overwhelmingly negative view on the issue of 
drone strikes.255 
U.S. drone policy in Pakistan is perhaps the most well documented of all 
countries in which the U.S. has reportedly employed drone strikes, with drone strikes 
beginning in June 2004 and continuing through the present. There have been more strikes 
in Pakistan than in any other non-declared battlefield country and the missions are 
reportedly under the command of the CIA, which originally launched missions from 
airbases within Pakistan, but now launches them from Afghanistan, after a rift in U.S.-
Pakistani relations in 2011.256 Under the Bush administration the CIA reportedly carried 
out an estimated 48 strikes in Pakistan that killed 377-558 people, of which 205-348 were 
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militants, 126-154 were civilians, and 46-56 were indeterminate in combatant stance.257 
Of those reported strikes, 18 were against al-Qaeda, 16 were against targets whose 
affiliation was unclear, 10 against the Taliban, two against the Haqqani, and two against 
BM.258 Under the Obama administration the CIA has reportedly carried out an estimated 
353 strikes in Pakistan that have killed 1905-3063 people, of which 1646-2680 were 
militants, 129-161 were civilians, and 130-222 were indeterminate in combatant 
stance.259 Of those reported strikes, 158 were against targets whose affiliation was unclear, 
110 were Taliban, 34 were Haqqani, 32 were al-Qaeda, 13 were BM, three were IMU, 
and two were Maulvi Nazir.260 
While the frequency and tempo of drone strikes have reportedly rapidly 
accelerated under the Obama administration, other relevant numbers appear to have 
decreased. Under the reported Bush administration strike numbers, the civilian casualty 
rate per strike was 3.3, the percent of unknown casualties was 40%, and the total casualty 
rate per strike was 8.0.261 Under the Obama administration the reported civilian casualty 
rate per strike is 0.7, the percent of unknown casualties is just under 7%, and the total 
casualty rate per strike is 5.6.262 Yet over the course of the reported 401 drone strikes only 
58 known militant leaders have been killed, representing only 2% of all deaths.263  
Reported drone strikes in Pakistan are primarily limited to the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas and the Northwest Frontier province, areas where Pakistan has 
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limited control of the territory and people living there. The Pakistani government has 
tended to be ambivalent in its opinion of U.S. drone strikes, at times publicly condemning 
U.S. violation of Pakistani sovereignty, while quietly feeding the CIA new target lists and 
encouraging the use of even more drone strikes.264 Yet Pakistani public opinion of the 
U.S. and drone strikes has plummeted over the years, especially worrisome for a 
supposed U.S. ally in the region. In Pakistan, 72% view America unfavorably, President 
Obama receives only a 10% approval rating, only 13% think U.S.-Pakistani relations 
have improved, and 68% of Pakistanis oppose U.S. drone strikes.265 Public perception of 
the powerlessness (or tacit consent) of the Pakistani government to end U.S. drone strikes 
in Pakistan, has only served to further agitate public disapproval of the central 
government and fueled questions of its legitimacy.266 
It is difficult to determine the effect that drone strikes have had on Pakistan as a 
whole, but by many standards it would not appear at first blush to be a net positive. The 
Pakistani government is under increasingly intense pressure from public opinion and 
domestic opposition to put an end to U.S. drone strikes, which when coupled with anti-
American sentiments over other issues, has only served to drive a wedge between the 
political establishment, the military, and the people.267 Additionally, despite the Pakistani 
government's appreciation of drone strike targets, U.S. drone strikes have also multiplied 
the number of enemies that the government must deal with. Islamic militant networks 
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with little capability to threaten the U.S., but with an increasingly larger chip against the 
Pakistani central government, have seen ranks swell with fresh recruits angry over U.S. 
drone strikes and willing to fight against the seemingly complicit central government.268 
While U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan have definitely served to thin the ranks and decimate 
the capability of al-Qaeda Central, our measure of efficacy must take note of the 
destabilizing factor that drone strikes may have on potential U.S. long-term objectives in 
Pakistan. 
U.S. drone policy in Yemen has more recently captured international attention 
with the outbreak of the Yemeni Civil War in February 2015, but like in Pakistan, U.S. 
drone strikes have been well documented for years. The first drone strike was in March 
2002 followed by a gap of nine years until drone strikes resumed in May 2011.269 Unlike 
with Pakistan, both the CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) 
reportedly run drone strikes in Yemen from basing in Djibouti and Saudi Arabia, which 
have been more willing partners in executing the missions.270 Also unlike Pakistan, the 
U.S. has used conventional aircraft strikes, cruise missile strikes, and special operations 
raids in Yemen, usually at the behest of the Yemenis government.271 Under the Bush 
administration only one drone strike was launched on March 11, 2002, against a known 
al-Qaeda leader, which killed six militants and no civilians.272 Under the Obama 
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administration it is reportedly estimated that 122 strikes have been initiated in Yemen that 
have killed 897-1155 people, of which 780-1013 were militants, 87-93 were civilians, 
and 30-49 were against targets whose affiliation was unclear.273 There is an additional 80-
96 reported airstrikes that might be attributable either to Yemenis aircraft or to U.S. 
drones, that have killed 334-486 people, of which 308-425 were militants and 26-61 were 
civilians.274 All of the reported strikes undertaken by both the Bush and Obama 
administrations have been against al-Qaeda, rebranded first as Ansar al Sharia and then 
later as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).275 
With only one drone strike under the Bush administration compared with the 122 
reported strikes under the Obama administration, it would be unfair to compare the 
statistical effectiveness of their drone strike policies. Reported civilian and unknown 
affiliation casualty rates over the course of the Obama administration have averaged 
between 14-15%, notably higher than in Pakistan, but have been steadily on the 
decline.276 Whereas reported drone strikes lessened in frequency in Pakistan after 2011, 
they began to spike in Yemen during 2012 alongside the Yemeni government air 
campaign against AQAP and over the course of 122 reported drone strikes at least 35 
known AQAP militant leaders have been killed.277 
Much like with Pakistan, drone strikes in Yemen have been fairly well 
documented, but are also a subject of some debate among monitoring non-governmental 
organizations, particularly on the validity of the other potential U.S. drone strikes. Drone 
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strikes in Yemen have been scattered across the country, but are most frequent in the 
north and central of the country where AQAP is well entrenched and the Yemeni 
government has even less control than it normally does. The Yemeni government has 
been more welcoming of U.S. drone strikes against AQAP and has supplied the U.S. with 
intelligence for target acquisition, which has placed it at odds with its restive population, 
particularly in the north.278 While there is little to go by in the way of public opinion data 
in Yemen, one poll conducted in 2007 found that 73.5% of Yemenis believed American 
involvement in the Middle East was justification for attacks on Americans, a shocking 
statistic well before the glut of drone strikes under the Obama administration.279 
With the collapse of Yemen into a civil war in February 2015, it has become 
increasingly difficult for U.S. drones to operate in Yemen, but that has not slowed the 
drone strike tempo.280 The difficulty in determining the effect of drone strikes in Yemen is 
the sheer number of problems facing the country, of which U.S. drone strikes are but one 
contentious issue and likely not the biggest one to most people.281 Much like in Pakistan, 
U.S. drone strikes could be seen to have weakened the legitimacy of the Yemeni 
government to handle its numerous problems, which has been exploited by AQAP to 
justify their campaign against the Sunni central government.282 Additionally, many 
Yemenis believe U.S. drones to be the source of all airstrikes in Yemen, whether the U.S. 
is involved or not, which has fueled an already agitated civilian population to forgo trust 
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in the central government and instead increasingly ally themselves with Islamic militant 
groups.283 AQAP has seen its ranks swell in recent years and the Islamic State has also 
managed to secure a foothold in Yemen.284 While the efficacy of U.S. drone policy in 
Yemen is unlikely the cause of Yemen's descent into chaos, we must note the role that 
drone strikes might play in undermining U.S. long-term objectives in Yemen.285 
U.S. drone policy in Somalia and Libya has been documented to a much lesser 
extent than in Pakistan and Yemen, with fewer total strikes and less clarity in reporting. 
U.S. drone strikes in Somalia have reportedly been undertaken by JSOC and possibly the 
CIA, from various bases in and around the Horn of Africa, all of which have occurred 
under the Obama administration.286 Like Yemen, the U.S. has also utilized conventional 
aircraft strikes, cruise missile strikes, naval bombardment, and special operations in 
Somalia in addition to drone strikes. Under the Obama administration it is reported that 
17-21 drone strikes were carried out in Somalia that have killed 33-121 people, of which 
33-114 were militants and 0-7 were civilians, with all drone strikes against al-Shabaab or 
its affiliates, reaching their highest frequency in 2015.287  
The USAF under the Obama administration carried out 105 drone strikes in Libya 
that killed an unknown number of people, with no way to breakdown the number of 
enemy combatants or civilians killed by U.S. drone strikes.288 U.S. drone strikes in Libya 
were flown in support of Operation Unified Protector during the multi-state coalition 
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military intervention in Libya from 19 March to 31 October 2011 and were flown by the 
USAF and NATO partners, but there have also potentially been additional drone strikes 
undertaken after 2011 by the Obama administration.289 Drone strikes in Libya accounted 
for only a handful of the total number of conventional strikes launched from a variety of 
other platforms in the duration of the conflict and an even smaller number potentially in 
post-intervention Libya.290 While drone strikes in Libya were originally isolated to a 
limited seven-month time frame in 2011, the Obama administration has undertaken at 
least one drone strike since the end of the coalition intervention. The recent killing of a 
top Islamic State leader in Libya on November 14, 2015, likely marks a shift in how the 
Obama administration intends to deal with Islamic militants in North Africa.291 
U.S. drone strikes in Somalia and Libya have been lightly documented, with little 
debate over the numbers because so few non-governmental organizations are actively 
monitoring the drone programs in those countries. Reported drone strikes in Somalia and 
Libya have been dispersed throughout those countries; in Somalia the porous nature of 
the country allows al-Shabaab to move freely throughout the south of the country and in 
Libya the need to target the forces of then Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi 
wherever they were encountered. The Somali government has been a willing partner to 
U.S. drone strikes within the country in support of its operations to defeat al-Shabaab and 
solidify government control of the exceptionally fragile country.292 The lack of any single 
central government in Libya has allowed the U.S. the capability to strike the fledgling 
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Islamic State in Libya and will likely be the case for some time to come. Neither Somalia 
nor Libya have the capability to gauge public opinion on domestic matters, let alone 
opinion of U.S. drone policy in their respective countries, though one could imagine that 
it might be viewed unfavorably. 
It is easier to determine the effect that U.S. drone strikes have had on Somalia and 
Libya, thus far, than on Pakistan or Yemen. In Somalia, the previous lack of any stable 
form of government or even something recognizing a cohesive state, has been replaced 
with a fragile, but increasingly capable government and military. The breakup of the 
Islamic Courts Union in 2006, the solidification of control of Mogadishu in 2011, and 
ongoing Somali military operations have devastated al-Shabaab numerically and 
territorially, though they are still a sizable force.293 In Libya, U.S. drone strikes as part of 
the larger air campaign by the coalition, were able to rapidly route the Libyan forces loyal 
to Gaddafi, but it is difficult to separate the effect that the drone strikes in particular had, 
as opposed to the effect of the larger air campaign as a whole. However, the complete 
collapse of the Libyan state as a direct result of the capitulation of Gaddafi, has led many 
to deem the coalition intervention a failure, which has fostered a growing number of 
increasingly hostile Islamic militant factions, to include a branch of the Islamic State.294 
U.S. drone policy in Afghanistan and Iraq has been documented in a rather 
piecemeal fashion over the years, since the beginning of the U.S. led invasions on 
October 7, 2001, and March 20, 2003, respectively. Both Afghanistan and Iraq were 
declared battlefields until December 2014 and December 2011, respectively, which would 
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have placed drone strikes under the command of the U.S. military. Post declared 
battlefield combat has seen the U.S. military act in a counterterrorism role in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, while the CIA has likely had some role to play in support to the 
military. An unknown number of drone strikes were launched by the U.S. military under 
the Bush administration during the duration of its conduct of the Afghan and Iraq Wars, 
whose effect would likely be indistinguishable from the plethora of conventional 
airstrikes launched and ground forces committed during the same time frame. Unlike the 
Bush administration, the Obama administration released monthly and yearly conventional 
aircraft and drone strike numbers in both Afghanistan and Iraq until 2013, when the U.S. 
military abruptly ended the disclosures.295 
During the reported years that Afghanistan and Iraq were declared battlefields, the 
U.S. military under the Obama administration launched 1,015 drone strikes in 
Afghanistan and 48 drone strikes in Iraq, that killed an unknown number of people.296 
Despite the end of U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan and a renewed focus on the 
counterterrorism mission in the country, the tempo of U.S. drone strikes appears to be 
similar to previously reported years. Under the Obama administration in 2015 it is 
estimated that the USAF has reportedly carried out 175 strikes in Afghanistan that killed 
749-1,131 people, of which 705-1,028 were militants and 44-103 were civilians.297 It is 
currently unknown how many drone strikes have been launched by the U.S. military in 
Iraq since June 2014 in support of the U.S. led coalition to defeat the Islamic State, but 
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there have been a few documented cases.298 
Reporting on U.S. drone strikes in Afghanistan and Iraq has been incredibly 
sparse, only recently having been picked up by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 
likely because of their nature as previously declared battlefields. The Afghani 
government, like the Pakistani government, has tended to be very ambivalent in its 
opinion of U.S. drone strikes; at times it has been outright hostile in publicly condemning 
the U.S., while other times it is seen as silently endorsing U.S. drone strikes.299 The Iraqi 
government has been a more willing partner to U.S. drone strikes against the Islamic 
State, largely due to a continued lack of capability to contain its spread.300 
While it is difficult to determine exactly what effect U.S. drone strikes have had 
on Afghanistan and Iraq, opponents to the use of drone strikes have used the current state 
of affairs in the respective countries as a measurement to suggest their efficacy is very 
bad. Over 14 years after the invasion of Afghanistan by the U.S. led coalition, the war in 
Afghanistan has no end in sight; while al-Qaeda Central has been devastated from a 
prolonged campaign of U.S. drone strikes, the Taliban and its affiliates are still capable of 
holding territory in a substantial portion of the country.301 Iraq has broken further apart in 
the years since the U.S. withdrawal from the country, delving quickly into sectarian 
violence between Shias and Sunnis and the proxies of other regional powers. The 
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inability or unwillingness of the Iraqi central government to put an end to the sectarian 
strife, led to the solidification of power and territorial control of northern Iraq (and much 
of Syria) under the barbaric Islamic State.302 U.S. drone policy in Afghanistan and Iraq 
has likely not endeared local civilian populations to the U.S. or for that matter, to their 
respective central governments, but it would be difficult to suggest that it is the primary 
or even a major contributor to the staying power of the Taliban in Afghanistan or the rise 
of the Islamic State in Iraq. The efficacy of U.S. drone policy in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
while still exceptionally capable of eliminating targeted forces in the short-term, might be 
unsustainable in the long-term, depending on the U.S. government’s perceived foreign 
policy objectives for the respective countries. 
Looking over the reported numbers and conditions spread across six countries in 
the Greater Middle East, it is worth discussing the perceived impact that drone strikes 
have had on militants and civilians and the long-term effects on the region as a whole. 
Drone strikes are as much a psychological weapon as they are a kinetic one, intended to 
strike fear into the hearts of terrorists everywhere by reciprocating the paranoiac fear of 
vulnerability that terrorists strike into the hearts of those they terrorize. As a 
psychological weapon against terrorists, drone strikes appear to have worked well, with 
even Osama bin Laden writing on their effect: 
I had mentioned in several previous messages ... the importance of the exit from 
Waziristan of the brother leaders, especially the ones that have media exposure. I 
stress this matter to you and that you choose distant locations to which to move 
them, away from aircraft, photography and bombardment while taking all security 
precautions. 303 
 
Yet the psychological effect is not limited to just terrorists, it spreads to the civilians and 
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communities around a target area, producing a mental health problem similar to 
anticipatory anxiety.304 This unnerving fear caused by drones makes civilians refrain from 
assisting those wounded in drone strikes, militant or not, and from congregating in groups 
in places where militants are known to have been before. This state of paranoia breeds 
suspicion in communities, spreads anti-American rumors, and feeds the legitimacy of 
extremist views against a government that would allow its own citizens to experience 
such fear, valid or not.305 
The acceptance of extremist views on the legitimacy of the government places 
domestic pressure on the ruling powers, which is then further compounded because U.S. 
drone policy actively undermines the authority of compliant governments.306 A 
cornerstone of U.S. counterterrorism policy is to buildup stable, effective, and legitimate 
governments that will oppose radicalism and address the factors breeding militants, 
without the need for American intervention.307 Yet in the process of carrying out drone 
strikes, the U.S. could be perceived as undermining the legitimacy of the government in 
the long-term for short-term capability or bolstering the host government policies which 
may have helped create the situation at the outset.308 There are valid arguments to be 
made for using drone strikes over conventional airstrikes or ground forces, which is often 
as much a debate about policy as it is about efficacy. However, while the U.S. may 
choose to promote the argument for the effectiveness of drone strikes over conventional 
airstrikes or ground forces to eliminate militants and minimize civilian casualties, the 
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numbers argument is rapidly lost on an already suspicious population.309 This is to say 
nothing on the potential loss of American perception and prestige broadly in the Greater 
Middle East, which may suffer as a result of continued drone strikes at the objection of 
Middle Eastern governments.  
So then what is the efficacy of U.S. drone warfare? At the very least the success 
or perception thereof of the U.S. drone program has fueled the development and 
proliferation of armed UAVs around the world. It has likely raised the risk of a global 
arms race to secure weaponized UAV capabilities by state and non-state actors, many of 
which may use them in ways unfavorable to U.S. policy objectives and interests. It would 
take no significant stretch of the imagination to consider what Russia could do with 
armed UAVs in its intervention in Syria or its hybrid war in the Ukraine, what China 
might do in its own restive western territories, what competing Middle Eastern states 
might proliferate to their religious proxies, or what al-Qaeda or the Islamic State could do 
with a competently armed UAV capability. 
If we gauge the efficacy of U.S. drone policy strictly by the numbers, it would be 
hard to argue that U.S. drone strikes have been anything but a success for U.S. goals. 
Adding together the drone strike and casualty estimates cited earlier in this section, the 
estimated 1,713 reported drone strikes carried out by the U.S. government under the Bush 
and Obama administrations, has reportedly led to the death of at least 4,600 militants or a 
minimum average of 2.7 militants killed per strike. Following the same math and cited 
estimates, those same 1,713 reported strikes have reportedly killed nearly 1,249 civilians 
or persons of unknown affiliation at a minimum average of 1.4 civilians or persons killed 
per strike or 21.4% of all deaths from U.S. drone strikes. These reported numbers are next 
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to impossible to compare with how conventional airstrikes or ground troops would fare in 
the same situation; though they are likely better than the alternative, that fact is likely 
little solace to the families of those killed. 
If we gauge the efficacy of U.S. drone policy by its capability to meet stated U.S. 
counterterrorism goals, it is more difficult to declare it an outright success. U.S. drone 
strikes have likely helped disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat terrorists, eliminated 
terrorist safe havens, degraded the links between terrorist groups, and deprived terrorists 
of their enabling means, but U.S. drone strikes have not likely served to counter extremist 
ideologies and their attempts to justify violence. On the contrary, it is possible that U.S. 
drone policy may have only served to fuel the acceptance, growth, and tacit approval by 
locals towards the extremist ideologies that have fostered the very terrorists the U.S. 
drone strikes are meant to eliminate. This is to say nothing of the ambiguous impact that 
U.S. drone policy may have on U.S. foreign policy in the Greater Middle East for years, 
perhaps decades, to come. While it is difficult to gauge the overall efficacy of U.S. drone 
policy, it has likely been successful for our short-term counterterrorism objectives, but 
may not be a net positive for our long-term goals. 
 
Chapter Summary 
The development and deployment of unmanned systems highlighted above serves 
as the backdrop for much of the ongoing debate over LAWS at the UN CCW Meeting of 
Experts on LAWS. Arguments over terminology and historical lineage that serves to 
differentiate unmanned systems from other weapon systems play an increasingly larger 
role in trying to establish some common ground in the LAWS debate. The U.S. 
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development and deployment of unmanned systems has fostered a proliferation of the 
systems internationally over the last several years, particularly armed ones, that will 
undoubtedly set the stage for future developments. Finally, the continuing question over 
the efficacy of drone warfare has exacerbated tensions on the issue of unmanned systems, 
which serves to undermine meaningful discussion on the issue and colors public 
perception over the development of unmanned systems at large. 
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THE ARMS CONTROL LEGACY 
 
After three years and as many meetings, several parties at the UN CCW Meeting 
of Experts on LAWS continue to voice support for an international prohibition on the 
development of LAWS. In their support for an international prohibition, proponents have 
pointed to previous arms control treaties and conventions as proof that the international 
community can make a ban on LAWS work. Protocol IV of the UN CCW is perhaps the 
most often cited analogous comparison of how the international community could 
prohibit the development and deployment of LAWS. Some activists also see the Ottawa 
Process that led to the Mine Ban Treaty as an alternative comparison, should efforts at the 
CCW fail to meet the desired goals of the prohibition. Still other prohibition proponents 
see a comparison to be made with the various arms control efforts aimed at weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) and the similarities in the arguments against those weapons. 
 
The Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons 
Protocol IV of the CCW, known as the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, is 
considered a successful precedent by proponents of international arms control efforts that 
could inform how a prohibition on LAWS would develop. Human Rights Watch and 
Harvard’s International Human Rights Clinic have issued a joint report suggesting 
Protocol IV is an example of how a preemptive ban on LAWS could work.310 The report 
highlights five “areas of concern” expressed by opponents of both blinding lasers and 
LAWS: “concerns under the Martens Clause, threats to civilians, risks of proliferation, 
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the need to clarify the legal landscape, and protection of legitimate technology.”311 While 
the two groups acknowledge that there are major differences between the legal, 
technological, and scale issues surrounding blinding lasers and LAWS, they argue that 
this only further enhances the critical need for a ban on LAWS.312 
Protocol IV only has four articles and is fairly short and simplistic in its 
language:313 
 Article I: It is prohibited to employ laser weapons specifically designed, as their 
sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent 
blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with 
corrective eyesight devices. The High Contracting Parties shall not transfer such 
weapons to any State or non-State entity. 
 Article II: In the employment of laser systems, the High Contracting Parties shall 
take all feasible precautions to avoid the incidence of permanent blindness to 
unenhanced vision. Such precautions shall include training of their armed forces 
and other practical measures. 
 Article III: Blinding as an incidental or collateral effect of the legitimate military 
employment of laser systems, including laser systems used against optical 
equipment, is not covered by the prohibition of this Protocol. 
 Article IV: For the purpose of this protocol "permanent blindness" means 
irreversible and uncorrectable loss of vision which is seriously disabling with no 
prospect of recovery. Serious disability is equivalent to visual acuity of less than 
20/200 Snellen measured using both eyes. 
The current path being pursued by proponents towards a ban on LAWS is 
strikingly similar to the path that led to the implementation of Protocol IV. The 
governments of Sweden and Switzerland introduced a joint proposal at the 1986 
International Conference of the Red Cross and again at the UN General Assembly in 
1987, calling for a ban on laser weapons that could cause “instantaneous permanent 
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blindness.”314 Blinding laser weaponry were thought to be in the early stages of 
development at the time, but received a tepid response from states assumed to be 
developing the weapons and from an international community that viewed the potential 
of the weapons as more science fiction than science fact.315 The International Committee 
of the Red Cross began its own inquiry into the proposal and convened four meeting of 
experts between 1989 and 1991 with a range of government and nongovernmental 
experts.316 Experts opined that blinding laser weapons were a concern under the Martens 
Clause, would cause suffering to both combatants and civilians, were a proliferation risk 
due to ease in production, might not comply with international humanitarian law, and 
could harm meaningful development of the technology for legitimate purposes.317 
Despite a general consensus from the meeting of experts on blinding weapons about the 
dangers that the weapons could pose, there was little apparent appetite among states to 
act on a weapon system that did not yet exist. The International Committee of the Red 
Cross published a book entitled Blinding Weapons in 1993, which contained the reports 
from the four meeting of experts and appealed widely to the public conscious to motivate 
governments to pursue a ban on blinding laser weapons at the 1995 First Review 
Conference.318  
In the lead up to the 1995 First Review Conference there were four meetings of 
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the GGEs between 1993 and 1995, which saw both Sweden and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross submit proposals in the third meeting for a ban of blinding 
laser weapons.319 During the fourth meeting of the GGEs, delegations negotiated a draft 
protocol to ban blinding laser weapons, which was met with concern by France and the 
UK over certain language used in the protocol and was opposed in its entirety by the U.S., 
which saw a new protocol as unnecessary.320 The International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Human Rights Watch, and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) pursued 
an aggressive campaign in the lead up to the 1995 First Review Conference, highlighting 
development of various military laser systems that did not preclude their use as blinders 
or dazzlers.321 The campaign led to increased public scrutiny of government positions and 
programs, particularly in the U.S. and China, which led many previously indifferent 
governments to move towards supporting the draft protocol.322 Protocol IV was 
successfully negotiated between 25 September and 13 October 1995 at the First Review 
Conference, was issued by the UN on 13 October 1995, and entered into force on 30 July 
1998.323 
However, Protocol IV does have its limitations. Protocol IV only covers the use of 
permanently blinding lasers in international conflict, which the U.S. government 
advocated should be extended to include internal conflict as well.324 Protocol IV also 
does not preclude the use of dazzlers, lasers which are supposed to only cause temporary 
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blindness or disorientation, which were developed by the U.S. military in the Iraq War 
and used against vehicles that ignored warnings at checkpoints.325 Yet the attention 
brought to bear on the issue of blinding laser weapons, which led to the successful 
negotiation and implementation of Protocol IV to the CCW and the continued non-use of 
the weapons on the battlefield, is seen as a victory by proponents, which could be 
replicated for LAWS.326 
 
The Mine Ban Treaty 
The effort led by NGOs to combat the use of mines which ultimately culminated 
in the Mine Ban Treaty, also known as the Ottawa Treaty, is another international arms 
control effort highlighted by proponents of a prohibition of LAWS. In another joint report 
by Human Rights Watch and Harvard’s International Human Rights Clinic the groups 
suggest that although the specific term of “meaningful human control” has not been used 
in international arms control treaties, the concept of human control has, citing the Mine 
Ban Treaty as precedence.327 The report argues that “it is the element of human control 
that distinguishes command-detonated mines from the antipersonnel mines covered by 
the Mine Ban Treaty. The treaty’s explicit prohibition of victim-activated mines reflects 
that they pose a greater threat to non-combatants than do command-detonated ones. It 
also demonstrates that states have objected to weapons that can operate and kill without 
human control.”328  
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The Mine Ban Treaty, the full title of which is the Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction, was drafted on 18 September 1997, opened to signatures on 3 December 
1997, and entered into force on 1 March 1999 with 162 state parties having ratified or 
acceded to the treaty.329 While the text of the Mine Ban Treaty is quite lengthy, there are a 
few major commitments that states undertake when they join the treaty:330 
 Never use antipersonnel mines, nor to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, 
stockpile, retain or transfer them. 
 Destroy mines in their stockpiles within four years. 
 Clear all mined areas in their territory within 10 years. 
 In mine-affected countries, conduct mine risk education and ensure the exclusion 
of civilians from mined areas. 
 Provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic 
reintegration, of mine victims. 
 Offer assistance to other States Parties, for example in providing for survivors or 
contributing to clearance programs. 
 Adopt national implementation measures (such as national legislation) to ensure 
that the terms of the treaty are upheld in their territory. 
 Report annually on progress in implementing the treaty. 
Some activists have argued that should the current path being pursued by 
proponents of a prohibition on LAWS before the CCW fail to meet the desired goal that 
proponents should emulate the ‘Ottawa Process’ that led to the Mine Ban Treaty.331 
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Protocol II of the CCW, as it was originally drafted in 1980, placed restrictions on the use 
of landmines, booby-traps, and other explosives devices, but was fairly limited in its 
reach, particularly applying only to international conflict between states. The continued 
use of anti-personnel landmines by countries in civil wars during the 1980s and at 
demilitarized zones like the 38th parallel between North and South Korea, led to criticism 
of the limited extent of Protocol II by NGOs, private citizens, and governments alike. The 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines was a coalition created in 1992 by six NGOs: 
Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Handicap International, Physicians for 
Human Rights, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and the Mines Advisory Group, 
that pooled their experience and expertise to push for a ban on anti-personnel mines.332 In 
1993 the International Campaign to Ban Landmines held the First International NGO 
Conference on Landmines in London which issued a report entitled Landmines: A Deadly 
Legacy and the U.S. State Department released its report entitled Hidden Killers: The 
Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, which drew international attention to the 
problem and the upcoming 1995 First Review Conference of the CCW.333 However, 
negotiators at the 1995 First Review Conference did not reach agreement on proposals to 
ban anti-personnel mines, suspending negotiations until 1996, which eventually led to the 
adoption of the “weak” amended Protocol II in April 1996.334 
Frustrated with the lack of an outright ban on anti-personnel mines in the 
amended Protocol II of the CWW, the Ottawa Process was born out of disappointment by 
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several smaller states and NGOs with the limited restrictions that Protocol II of the CCW 
placed upon anti-personnel mines.335 In October 1996 Canada hosted a convention in 
Ottawa attended by 75 nation-states and numerous NGOs and other international 
organizations to promote negotiation of a separate treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines, 
beginning the Ottawa Process aimed at negotiating a treaty within a year.336 An intense 
publicity campaign led by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines followed, which 
aimed to increase awareness among the citizenry of undecided or opposed nation-states 
in-order to pressure governments into signing the soon to be negotiated treaty.337 Belgium 
hosted the follow-up to the Ottawa convention from 24-27 June 1997, The Brussels 
International Conference for a Total Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines, which led to 
97 governments signing the Brussels Declaration calling for the formal negotiation of a 
comprehensive anti-personnel landmine ban treaty.338 The follow-on Oslo Diplomatic 
Conference on a Total Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines, occurred from 1-18 
September 1997, which negotiated the Mine Ban Treaty with 89 state parties adopting the 
treaty at the time.339  
While the Mine Ban Treaty is lauded by activists as a successful campaign of 
concerned citizens, NGOs, and smaller nation-states’ capability to lead negotiations to the 
conclusion of an international arms control treaty, it is not without its share of criticism. 
So far 35 states have not signed or ratified the treaty, including the U.S., Russia, China, 
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India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, and North and South Korea.340 The U.S. 
has thus far chosen not to join the Mine Ban Treaty, though it does abide by the treaty’s 
requirements, except on the Korean Peninsula.341 The U.S. has long advocated for the 
continued use of “smart mines” that deactivate or self-destruct automatically after a 
limited time frame, having long since stopped using traditional persistent mines, on the 
Korean Peninsula because of its unique security environment.342 Some states and non-
state actors continue to have active minefields, produce new anti-personnel mines, or 
have actively mined new areas.343 Several state parties to the treaty have discussed 
exiting the treaty, at either the national or international level, due to the needs of military 
necessity along contentious borders, such as Ukraine and Finland.344 Continued 
opposition to the Mine Ban Treaty exists for various reasons, from those who feel that 
mines could be adequately restricted to responsible use, to those who believe the treaty 
does not go far enough and should have included anti-vehicle mines as well.345 The 
criticisms aside, some proponents of a ban on LAWS see an alternative process, like the 
Ottawa Process that led to the Mine Ban Treaty, as another potential avenue to pursue.346 
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Weapons of Mass Destruction and Arms Control 
Other proponents of a prohibition on LAWS have opined that perhaps the closest 
analogy in urgency and impact to the need to outright ban LAWS is that of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD). To that end, LAWS have been repeatedly described as “the 
third revolution in warfare, after gunpowder and nuclear arms.”347 Arguments used in the 
debates for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC), and in the enduring debates over nuclear weapons, strike a similar chord to the 
case that has been made again LAWS. 
The BWC, the full title of which is the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on their Destruction, is considered the first international arms control treaty 
that bans the development, production, and stockpiling of an entire category of WMD.348 
The BWC was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force 26 March 
1975, upon the deposit of 22 nation-states’ instruments of ratification, with 174 state 
parties having ratified or acceded to the treaty.349 The CWC, the full title of which is the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, is considered a necessary follow up to the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925.350 The CWC was adopted by the Conference on Disarmament 
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in Geneva on 3 September 1992 and opened for signatures on 13 January 1993.351 The 
CWC went into force on 29 April 1997 after ratification by 65 nation-states, with 192 
state parties having ratified or acceded to the treaty.352 
Both the BWC and the CWC lay out the scope for a specific ban on two entire 
groups of weapons and encompass the full cycle of development, production, and 
acquisition or retention of the weapons, legal language a ban on LAWS would likely 
emulate. Much like a potential ban on LAWS, the BWC and CWC also deal with 
weapons that have legitimate peaceful civilian technology applications and numerous 
beneficial dual-use technologies. Activists argue that international efforts to ban chemical 
and biological weapons, along with the continuing debate over nuclear weapons, are 
motivated at least in part by concerns over violations of international humanitarian law 
and human rights that are comparable to the concerns held regarding LAWS.353 While a 
human can decide on the timing and placement of an initial target in using chemical and 
biological weapons, the effects of these weapons after release are uncontrollable and can 
spread to cause unintended victims.354 Chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons are 
viewed as causing unnecessary suffering and outside of perhaps a few isolated scenarios, 
are indiscriminate in nature to both combatants and noncombatants, which can be seen to 
violate principles of jus in bello and other international human rights laws.355 It is also 
argued that LAWS, like nuclear weapons, would be in violation of the Martens Clause 
and raises the concern of a ban over more contemporary concepts such as malum in se 
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(evil in itself).356 
 Yet both the BWC and CWC suffer criticism over their lack of universality and 
enforcement measures. Only 174 nation-states have ratified or acceded to the BWC, 22 
short of the 196 that may become members,357 and 192 nation-states have ratified or 
acceded to the CWC, five short of the 197 that may become members.358 While both the 
BWC and CWC allow complaints to be lodged with the UN Security Council, neither 
treaty prescribes concrete actions to be taken against violators of the respective treaties. 
The BWC also lacks a verification measure, which allowed the Soviet Union to continue 
a biological weapons program, Biopreparat, for decades after it ratified the BWC and has 
undermined confidence in the treaty.359 Additionally, the alleged use of chemical weapons 
in the Syrian Civil War by the Syrian government and the Islamic State, may also serve to 
undermine confidence in the CWC as well.360 Neither the BWC nor the CWC have been 
perfect or infallible in their efforts to prevent deceit or abuse, as a ban on LAWS might 
also reflect, yet it is the similar arguments over international humanitarian law and human 
rights that activists tend to laude in their debate over a ban on LAWS.361 
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Chapter Summary 
It is important to take note of the processes and arguments highlighted above of 
previous international arms control efforts by proponents at the UN CCW Meeting of 
Experts on LAWS, as it emboldens claims by activists that international arms control can 
be successful to some degree. Much as was the case in crafting the language of previous 
arms control efforts, it is important that any potential prohibition on LAWS properly 
protect the beneficial applications of the technology from being negatively impacted by a 
ban.362 Yet despite a general lack of consensus on more basic issues, the case for an 
international prohibition continues to be pushed forward by groups like Human Rights 
Watch, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, and the Women's International League for 
Peace and Freedom. The arguments made by activists pointing to the perceived successes 
of Protocol IV of the UN CCW, the Ottawa Process in negotiating the Mine Ban Treaty, 
and the cases made for bans of weapons of mass destruction, will likely continue to play 
out before the UN CCW 2016 Fifth Review Conference in December. It is important to 
remember these considerations, as the paper nears its conclusion and addresses the case 
for prohibition.  
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CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL PROHIBITION 
 
In debating the issue at the UN CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS, the case for 
an international prohibition has been ever present, but at times ill defined. In their support 
for an international prohibition, proponents have pointed to previous arms control treaties 
and conventions, as proof that the international community can make a ban on LAWS 
work. Still others, a smaller minority of opponents and skeptics, have voiced their 
opinion on why either such a prohibition on LAWS will not work or is unnecessary. 
Regardless of whether they support or oppose a ban on LAWS, both proponents and 
opponents agree that there are many issues and concerns surrounding the development 
and deployment of LAWS that need to be addressed before the systems are introduced. 
The culmination of the discourse and debate from the three previous Meeting of Experts 
on LAWS at Geneva, will be argued before the UN CCW’s 2016 Fifth Review 
Conference in Geneva on 12-16 December 2016. 
At the 2015 Meeting of Experts, the mandate for the 2016 meeting expanded to 
include an additional concern, that “the meeting of experts may agree by consensus on 
recommendations for further work for consideration by the 2016 Fifth Review 
Conference."363 The 2016 Meeting of Experts agreed on a non-binding recommendation 
that the High Contracting Parties to the CCW should formally establish a Group of 
Government Experts (GGE) on LAWS at the 2016 Fifth Review Conference.364 If the 
parties to the 2016 Fifth Review Conference endorse the recommendation, then the GGE 
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on LAWS would meet in 2017 and 2018 to “explore and agree on possible 
recommendations on options related to emerging technologies in the area of LAWS.”365 
The GGE on LAWS could theoretically offer up any number of recommendations to be 
taken up by the High Contracting Parties, from more meetings and more discussion on 
understanding LAWS to actual mechanisms to implement a ban on LAWS.366 The UN 
CCW’s 2016 Fifth Review Conference will set the stage for continued engagement at 
some level on the issue of LAWS, but to what end is unclear. Whatever measures come 
from the GGE will likely determine whether the ongoing effort in the CCW will satisfy 
the concerns of proponents or if they will resort to going outside the body to pursue a 
prohibition. The primary concluding question then, is whether the case has been made for 
the international community to move towards implementing a prohibition of LAWS at 
this time? 
In order to answer that question, we must ask what an international prohibition on 
LAWS would look like? Beyond the general consensus statement that a ban on LAWS is 
needed and now, few proponent parties to the UN CCW Meeting of Experts on LAWS 
have actually put forward qualitative recommendations on the topic. One of the few 
proposed recommendations comes from the International Committee for Robot Arms 
Control in a May 2013 working paper, Compliance Measures for an Autonomous 
Weapons Convention.367 State parties to the proposed “Autonomous Weapons Convention” 
would, among other things, pledge “not to develop, test, produce, stockpile, deploy, 
transfer, broker transfer, or use weapon systems capable of autonomous target selection 
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and engagement.”368 Compliance to the convention would be enforced by a treaty 
implementing organization that could “facilitate consultations, implement technical 
safeguards, and conduct inquiries and investigations when so mandated.”369 In-order to 
verify that LAWS were not being used by a state party to the convention, there would be 
a need for a technical evidence trail of sorts that would monitor and record a wide range 
and amount of data on any weapons system with autonomous capability, the logistics of 
which appear troubling.370 However, rather than presently propose a qualitative 
recommendation for a prohibition on LAWS, many proponents have instead advised that 
previous efforts at arms control would inform the development of any effort to ban 
LAWS. Yet few reports to that end appear to adequately address the criticisms and 
implementation concerns that have surrounded the previous arms control efforts often 
lauded by proponents, such as Protocol IV of the CCW, the Mine Ban Treaty, and the 
BWC and CWC.  
Indeed, the same issues of universality, implementation, and verification that have 
plagued those arms control efforts would undoubtedly also be a concern for any 
prohibition on LAWS. Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, writing for the Hoover 
Institute, opined that an international treaty regulating or prohibiting LAWS would have 
“little traction among those most likely to develop and use them” and even states inclined 
to support a ban “will find it difficult to reach agreement on scope or definitions because 
lethal autonomy will be introduced incrementally.”371 Even if broad acceptance and 
consensus could be reached, they argue there would still be “the collective action 
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problems of failure and defection that afflict all such treaty regimes, especially when 
dealing with dual-use (civilian and military) underlying technologies.”372 Author Erik 
Schechter echoes Anderson and Waxman’s argument that such a prohibition would not 
work, stating that “what makes a machine autonomous is its software, and that is buried 
deep within the system. Trying to distinguish a robot from a drone is like guessing what 
the apps are on a stranger's smartphone by looking at its protective case.”373  
Yet questions continue to arise from the arguments that have been made. Should 
we ban LAWS? What makes LAWS so different from other weapons systems that a ban 
is necessary? Would a ban work? What would a ban look like? What systems would we 
ban? How would we implement and verify a ban? How would this affect legitimate 
development of autonomy and robotics? These examples are but a few of the many 
questions that are being raised, some of which currently have no good answer from either 
proponents or opponents. If the GGE on LAWS were to recommend concrete steps be 
taken towards a ban on LAWS, it would need to address these concerns and it appears at 
this point that the argument for such a ban does not provide the most thorough of answers 
on how to do so. 
So has the case for an international prohibition of LAWS been adequately made 
by proponents or argued against by opponents? As the exchanges on the many issues and 
concerns surrounding the development and deployment of LAWS outlined above 
demonstrates, much of the debate on the issues surrounding LAWS and actual measures 
to implement such a prohibition are in their infancy. Both proponents and opponents to an 
international prohibition of LAWS will make their case, again, before the 2016 Fifth 
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Review Conference, where there will be a clear need for a better understanding of the 
issues surrounding LAWS and where it should become increasingly apparent that an 
acceptable level of consensus has not been reached on many of the concerns. It is 
important that the GGE on LAWS not rush to endorse recommendations for immediate 
action be taken to ban LAWS, but instead foster continued investigation of the issues. 
The international community is not, at this time, adequately prepared to implement a ban 
nor properly informed of the extent of the issues surrounding LAWS and should not rush 
to make a decision while the lead time on development currently permits further 
discourse.374 Yet the reality of the situation will not likely stop proponents from 
continuing to push for the rapid implementation of a ban on LAWS and while it is 
important that they are continuing to raise perception of the issues surrounding LAWS, a 
ban at this time seems a bit premature. 
The lack of consensus on many of the most basic issues is troubling, even more so 
considering the calls to implement a wide ranging prohibition despite the uncertainties 
and without a clear path forward on how such a ban would work. The push by proponents 
for a ban on LAWS as soon as possible, without clear agreement or understanding on 
many of the complexities surrounding the issue, has the potential to undermine the end 
result’s implementation and verification. Before we are rushed headlong into an 
unrealistic or undesirable international agreement that will directly impacts our national 
interests, the U.S. government might advocate for more time to consider the issue and 
restraint by the international community in order to allow greater discourse on the issue 
to happen.  
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There are a couple of ways that the U.S. government might encourage such a 
move. The U.S. DoD has already laid out a cautionary, but well formed, path forward on 
the development of unmanned systems and autonomy through DoD Directive 3000.09, 
Autonomy in Weapon Systems. Even proponents who view DoD Directive 3000.09 as a 
paltry first step welcome its “clear lines of responsibility for creating guidelines for 
system development, testing and evaluation, equipment/weapons training, as well as 
developing doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures.”375 While proponents may chide 
the U.S. government because they believe DoD Directive 3000.09 does not go far enough, 
there is no reason why it should not be viewed as better than no guidance at all. Indeed, 
the U.S. is the only country that has done so thus far and there is little reason why the 
establishment of such national guiding documents internationally could not be one of the 
recommendations by the U.S. delegation to the GGE on LAWS.  
Additionally, the U.S. delegation to the Meeting of Experts, supported by the 
British, Canadian, and German delegations, highlighted transparency measures and 
national legal reviews of new weapon systems in accordance with Article 36 of the 
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention as confidence building measures that 
parties to the CCW could undertake.376 The first steps in a proposed transparency action 
plan highlighted in the 2015 Meeting of Experts included: “creation of a focal point at a 
national level in order to overcome the fragmentation of information at different national 
levels; establishment of a point of contact for the international exchange of information; 
increasing the frequency of interaction; and sharing information on a voluntary basis and 
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making it widely available.”377 It was noted that while such transparency efforts would 
not constitute an overall solution, “it can be an important step and a precondition for 
further regulation” and would be useful in “deterring violations of regulations, exposing 
abuse, setting a positive precedent, fostering democratic legitimacy and promoting an 
informed public debate.”378 While some countries, such as China, India, and Russia, have 
opined that such measures are premature at this time, if the alternative is an outright ban 
of LAWS, there appears to be no reason why such measures could not be another 
recommendation put forward by the U.S. delegation to the GGE on LAWS.379  
Steps like these increase the number of options available to the U.S. delegation to 
the GGE on LAWS, would foster confidence in the ongoing process, and encourage 
debate on the issues surrounding LAWS to continue. The U.S. government could 
encourage other countries at the 2016 Fifth Review Conference to pledge to support and 
implement similar policies in the international development of unmanned systems and 
autonomy, as an intermittent step, while the concerns surrounding LAWS are addressed. 
While the measures may be viewed as imperfect or unwarranted, there are few others 
being openly put forward at this time by other parties to the 2016 Fifth Review 
Conference, which the U.S. could capitalize on to help lead it in a favorable direction. It 
is important that the U.S. government help representatives to the 2016 Fifth Review 
Conference and the GGE to look beyond the hyperbole and not rush headlong into a 
prohibition until we better understand the complexities that surround the issue of LAWS. 
                                                 
377 United Nations, “Advanced Copy of the Report of the 2015 informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS),” United Nations, accessed July 14, 2016, 
http://www.genf.diplo.de/contentblob/4567632/Daten/5648966/201504berichtexpertentreffenlaws.pdf, p. 
25. 
378 Ibid, p. 24. 
379 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, “Report on Activities,” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, June 4, 2015, 
http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/KRC_CCWx2015_Report_4June2015_uploaded.pdf, p. 20-21. 
 109 
LITERATURE CITED 
 
Ackerman, Spencer and Noah Shachtman. “Almost 1 in 3 U.S. Warplanes Is a Robot.” 
Wired, January 9, 2012. https://www.wired.com/2012/01/drone-report/. 
Alexander, David. “U.S. says will abide by Mine Ban Treaty except on Korean 
Peninsula.” Reuters, September 23, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
defense-landmines-idUSKCN0HI1U920140923. 
Almosawa, Shuaib, Kareem Fahim, and Eric Schmitt. “Islamic State Gains Strength in 
Yemen, Challenging Al Qaeda.” New York Times, December 15, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/world/middleeast/islamic-state-gains-
strength-in-yemen-rivaling-al-qaeda.html?_r=0. 
Almukhtar, Sarah and Karen Yourish. “More Than 14 Years After U.S. Invasion, the 
Taliban Control Large Parts of Afghanistan.” New York Times, September 14, 
2015. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/29/world/asia/afghanistan-
taliban-maps.html?_r=0. 
Alpert, Emily. “Why hasn't the U.S. signed an international ban on land mines.” Los 
Angeles Times, April 5, 2012. 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/04/mine-treaty-us-ottawa-
convention.html. 
Anderson, Kenneth, Daniel Resiner and Matthew Waxman. “Adapting the Law of Armed 
Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems.” International Law Studies (90 Int’l L. 
Stud. 386). Accessed May 23, 2016. 
https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a2ce46e7-1c81-4956-a2f3-
c8190837afa4/dapting-the-Law-of-Armed-Conflict-to-Autonomous-We.aspx. 
Anderson, Kenneth and Matthew Waxman. “Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon 
Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can.” Hoover 
Institution, April 9, 2013. 
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/Anderson-
Waxman_LawAndEthics_r2_FINAL.pdf. 
Arkin, Ronald. “The Case for Banning Killer Robots: Counterpoint.” Communications of 
the ACM, December 1, 2015. http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2015/12/194632-
the-case-for-banning-killer-robots/fulltext#R8. 
Arnett, George. “The Numbers Behind the Worldwide Trade in Drones.” The Guardian, 
March 17, 2015. 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/mar/16/numbers-behind-
worldwide-trade-in-drones-uk-israel. 
 110 
Article 36. “Key areas for debate on autonomous weapons systems.” Article 36, May 
2014. http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/A36-CCW-May-
2014.pdf. 
Article 36. “Killer Robots: UK Government Policy on Fully Autonomous Weapons.” 
Article 36, April 2013. http://www.article36.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Policy_Paper1.pdf. 
Atherton, Kelsey D. “The History of the Drone in 9 Minutes [Video].” Popular Science, 
November 24, 2014. http://www.popsci.com/watch-brief-history-drone. 
Bailey, Ronald. “Bring On the Killer Robots.” Newsweek, February 01, 2015. 
http://www.newsweek.com/bring-killer-robots-303299. 
Beckhusen, Robert. “Ukraine Resurrects Soviet-Era Super Drones.” War Is Boring, June 
5, 2014. https://warisboring.com/ukraine-resurrects-soviet-era-super-drones-
3403f80c51ba#.jj7f7q9k2. 
Bender, Bryan. “Formerly a leader on land mine ban, Obama now balks.” Boston Globe, 
June 22, 2014. https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/06/21/nearly-
two-decades-after-leading-role-remains-sidelines-treaty-banning-
landmines/oMeRDQjDB3W2vj4VtuYqWK/story.html. 
Benson, Pam. “Bin Laden Documents: Fear of Drones.” CNN, May 3, 2012. 
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/03/bin-laden-documents-fear-of-drones/. 
Bergen, Peter and Emily Schneider. “Hezbollah Armed Drone? Militants’ New Weapon.” 
CNN, September 22, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/22/opinion/bergen-
schneider-armed-drone-hezbollah/. 
Bergen, Peter and Jennifer Rowland. “A Dangerous New World of Drones.” CNN, 
October 8, 2012. http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/01/opinion/bergen-world-of-
drones/. 
Bieri, Matthias and Marcel Dickow. “Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: Future 
Challenges.” Center for Security Studies (No. 164), November 2014. 
http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-
securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse164-EN.pdf. 
Blom, John David. “Unmanned Aerial Systems: A Historical Perspective.” Combat 
Studies Institute Press (Occasional Paper 37). Accessed May 22, 2016. 
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/OP37.pdf. 
Booker, Brakkton. “New Drone Study Finds 327 ‘close encounters’ with Manned 
Aircraft.” NPR, December 11, 2015. http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2015/12/11/459366656/new-drone-study-finds-327-close-encounters-with-
manned-aircraft. 
 111 
Botelho, Greg and Barbara Starr. “U.S. ‘Reasonably certain’ Drone Strike Killed ISIS 
Mouthpiece ‘Jihadi john.’” CNN, November 14, 2015. 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/13/middleeast/jihadi-john-airstrike-target/. 
Bowcott, Owen. “UK Opposes International Ban on Developing ‘killer robots.’” The 
Guardian, April 14, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/apr/13/uk-
opposes-international-ban-on-developing-killer-robots. 
Boyle, Michael. “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare.” International Affairs 
89: 1 (2013). Accessed May 22, 2016. http://5ton.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/drone-warfare_costs-
consequences_chatham_Boyle_2013.pdf. 
Brown, Ryan Lenora. “Land Mines Could Be Almost Completely Gone Within a Decade, 
Experts Say.” The Christian Science Monitor, October 20, 2014. 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Progress-Watch/2014/1020/Land-mines-could-
be-almost-completely-gone-within-a-decade-experts-say. 
Browne, Ryan. “Air Force Faces Shortage of Drone and Jet Pilots.” CNN, March 17, 
2016. http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/17/politics/air-force-pilot-shortage/. 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, The. “CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to 
present.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Accessed May 22, 2016. 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NAfjFonM-
Tn7fziqiv33HlGt09wgLZDSCP-
BQaux51w/edit?pref=2&pli=1#gid=1000652376. 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, The. “US strikes in Somalia, 2007 to present.” The 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Accessed May 22, 2016. 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-LT5TVBMy1Rj2WH30xQG9nqr8-
RXFVvzJE_47NlpeSY/edit?pref=2&pli=1#gid=1110953463. 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, The. “US strikes in Yemen, 2002 to present.” The 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Accessed May 22, 2016. 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lb1hEYJ_omI8lSe33izwS2a2lbiygs0hTp
2Al_Kz5KQ/edit?pref=2&pli=1#gid=977256262. 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. “Ban Support Grows, Process Goes Slow.” Campaign 
to Stop Killer Robots, April 15, 2016. 
https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2016/04/thirdmtg/. 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. “Consensus Killer Robots Must Be Addressed.” 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, May 28, 2013. 
https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2013/05/nations-to-debate-killer-robots-at-un/. 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. “Country Policy Positions.” Campaign to Stop Killer 
Robots, March 26, 2015. http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/KRC_CCWexperts_Countries_25Mar2015.pdf. 
 112 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. “Country Views on Killer Robots.“ Campaign to Stop 
Killer Robots, April 14, 2016. http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/CountryViews_14Apr2016.pdf. 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. “More States Speak out at UN.” Campaign to Stop 
Killer Robots, October 30, 2013. 
https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2013/10/unga2013/. 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. “Report on Activities.” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 
June 4, 2015. http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/KRC_CCWx2015_Report_4June2015_uploaded.pdf. 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. “Report on outreach on the UN report on ‘lethal 
autonomous robotics’.” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, July 31, 2013. 
http://stopkillerrobots.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/KRC_ReportHeynsUN_Jul2013.pdf. 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. “Who We Are.” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. 
Accessed May 23, 2016. http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/coalition/. 
Caton, Jeffrey L. “Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Brief Survey of Developmental, 
Operational, Legal, and Ethical Issues,” Strategic Studies Institute, December 
2015, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1309. 
Cardinal, David. “Drones Provide Terrorists with a DIY Air Force.” ExtremeTech, 
August 29, 2014. http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/188941-drones-provide-
terrorists-with-a-diy-air-force. 
Currier, Cora. “Everything We Know So Far about Drone Strikes.” ProPublica, February 
5, 2013. https://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-so-far-about-
drone-strikes. 
“Definition of Automation.” Merriam-Webster. Accessed May 23, 2016. 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/automation. 
“Definition of Autonomy.” Merriam-Webster. Accessed May 23, 2016. 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy. 
“Definition of Robot.” Oxford Dictionary. Accessed May 23, 2016. 
https://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/robot. 
Docherty, Bonnie. “Why We Need to Ban Killer Robots.” Human Rights Watch, April 
15, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/15/why-we-need-ban-killer-robots. 
Doswald-Beck, Louise. “New Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons.” International 
Committee of the Red Cross, October 13, 1995. 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jn4y.htm. 
 113 
Downes, Larry. “America Can’t Lead the World in Innovation If the FAA Keeps 
Dragging Its Feet on Drone Rules.” Washington Post, October 8, 2014. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2014/10/08/america-cant-
lead-the-world-in-innovation-if-the-faa-keeps-dragging-its-feet-on-drone-rules/. 
“Drone Close Calls with Airliners Surged in 2015,” Newsmax, March 29, 2016, 
https://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/drones-airlines-close-calls-
FAA/2016/03/29/id/721290/. 
Eshel, Noam. “A Mini UAV Becomes a Suicide Drone.” Aviation Week Network, June 
16, 2015. http://aviationweek.com/paris-air-show-2015/mini-uav-becomes-
suicide-drone-0. 
Faizi, Aimal. “Drones Kill Any Chance of Peace in Afghanistan.” Al Jazeera, June 29, 
2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/06/drones-kill-chance-
peace-afghanistan-150628132016117.html. 
Federal Aviation Administration. “FAA Aerospace Forecasts FY 2016-2036: Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems.” Federal Aviation Administration. Accessed May 22, 2016. 
https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/media/Unmanne
d_Aircraft_Systems.pdf. 
Ford, Chris and Chris Jenks. “The International Discussion Continues: 2016 CCW 
Experts Meeting on Lethal Autonomous Weapons.” Just Security, April 20, 2016. 
https://www.justsecurity.org/30682/2016-ccw-experts-meeting-laws/. 
Friedersdorf, Conor. “The Rapid Rise of Federal Surveillance Drones over America.” The 
Atlantic, March 10, 2016. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/the-rapid-rise-of-federal-
surveillance-drones-over-america/473136/. 
Future of Life Institute. “Open Letter on Autonomous Weapons.” Future of Life Institute. 
Accessed May 23, 2016. http://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons. 
Gage, Douglas W. “UGV HISTORY 101: A Brief History of Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
(UGV) Development Efforts.” Unmanned Systems Magazine, Vol. 13, No. 3 
(Summer 1995). Accessed May 22, 2016. 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=881C89DDD940FD2FF
3956EC7B7AAA477?doi=10.1.1.41.7062&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
Galliott, Jai. “Why We Should Welcome ‘killer robots’, Not Ban Them.” Phys.org, July 
30, 2015. http://phys.org/news/2015-07-killer-robots.html. 
Gertler, Jeremiah. “U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems.” Congressional Research Service 
(R42136), January 3, 2012. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42136.pdf. 
 114 
Ghobari, Mohammed. “Yemen Asks U.S. For Drones to Fight Al Qaeda.” Reuters, 
August 22, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-usa-drones-
idUSBRE97L0PZ20130822. 
Gibbons-Neff, Thomas. “Israeli-Made Kamikaze Drone Spotted in Nagorno-Karabakh 
Conflict.” Washington Post, April 5, 2016. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/04/05/israeli-made-
kamikaze-drone-spotted-in-nagorno-karabakh-conflict/. 
GlobalSecurity.org, “Chang Kong (CK-1).” GlobalSecurity.org, November 2007. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/ck-1.htm. 
GlobalSecurity.org. “Future Combat Systems (FCS) / Future Combat System (FCS).” 
Accessed May 22, 2016. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/fcs.htm. 
Gordon, Michael R. and Eric Schmitt. “U.S. Said to Rebuff Iraqi Request to Strike 
Militants.” New York Times, August 2, 2014. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/world/middleeast/iraq-asked-us-for-
airstrikes-on-militants-officials-say.html?_r=0. 
Groves, Steven. “The U.S. Should Oppose the U.N.’S Attempt to Ban Autonomous 
Weapons.” Heritage Foundation, March 5, 2015. 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/03/the-us-should-oppose-the-uns-
attempt-to-ban-autonomous-weapons. 
Gubrud, Mark and Jürgen Altmann. “Compliance Measures for an Autonomous Weapons 
Convention.” International Committee for Robot Arms Control, May 2013. 
http://icrac.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Gubrud-Altmann_Compliance-
Measures-AWC_ICRAC-WP2-2.pdf. 
Guttman, Jon. “Goliath Tracked Mine: The Beetle That Started the ROV Craze.” 
HistoryNet, May 5, 2011. http://www.historynet.com/goliath-tracked-mine-the-
beetle-that-started-the-rov-craze.htm. 
Hanlon, Mike. “The Protector Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV).” GizMag. August 16, 
2006. http://www.gizmag.com/go/6023/. 
Hennigan, W J. “Air Force Struggles to Add Drone Pilots and Address Fatigue and 
Stress.” Los Angeles Times, November 9, 2015. 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-drone-pilot-crisis-20151109-story.html. 
Hennigan, W J and David S Cloud. “U.S. Airstrikes in Somalia Signal a More Direct 
Role Against Shabab.” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2015. 
http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-us-airstrikes-somalia-20150723-story.html. 
Hersman, Rebecca, “Syria’s Toxic War: Chemical Weapons Are Undermining 
Deterrence and Nonproliferation.” War on the Rocks, April 26, 2016. 
 115 
http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/syrias-toxic-war-chemical-weapons-are-
undermining-deterrence-and-nonproliferation/. 
Heyns, Christof. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extradjudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns.” United Nations, April 9,2013. 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session
23/A-HRC-23-47_en.pdf. 
Hoenig, Milton. “Hezbollah and the Use of Drones as a Weapon of Terrorism.” 
Federation of American Scientists, June 5, 2014. http://fas.org/pir-pubs/hezbollah-
use-drones-weapon-terrorism/. 
Holy See, The. “Elements Supporting the Prohibition of Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems.” The Holy See, April 7, 2016. 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/752E16C02C9AE
CE4C1257F8F0040D05A/$file/2016_LAWSMX_CountryPaper_Holy+See.pdf. 
Horrowitz, Michael. “Ban killer robots? How about defining them first.” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, June 24, 2016. http://thebulletin.org/ban-killer-robots-how-
about-defining-them-first9571. 
Horrowitz, Michael C. and Paul Scharre. “Meaningful Human Control in Weapon 
Systems: A Primer.” Center for a New American Security, March 2015. 
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-
pdf/Ethical_Autonomy_Working_Paper_031315.pdf. 
Human Rights Watch. “Killer Robots and the Concept of Meaningful Human Control.” 
Human Rights Watch, April 11, 2016. 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/11/killer-robots-and-concept-meaningful-
human-control. 
Human Rights Watch. “Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots.” Human 
Rights Watch, April 29, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-
humanity/case-against-killer-robots. 
Human Rights Watch. “Precedent for Preemption: The Ban on Blinding Lasers as a 
Model for a Killer Robots Prohibition.” Human Rights Watch, November 8, 2015. 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/08/precedent-preemption-ban-blinding-lasers-
model-killer-robots-prohibition. 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines. “About Us.” International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines. Accessed May 25, 2016. http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/about-us/who-we-
are/the-icbl.aspx. 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines. “Frequently Asked Questions.” International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines. Accessed May 25, 2016. http://www.icbl.org/en-
gb/the-treaty/treaty-in-detail/frequently-asked-questions.aspx. 
 116 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines. “Timeline of the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines.” International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Accessed May 25, 
2016. http://www.icbl.org/media/916929/icb009_chronology_a5_v4-pages.pdf. 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines. “Treaty Text.” International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines. Accessed May 25, 2016. http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/the-
treaty/treaty-in-detail/treaty-text.aspx. 
International Committee of the Red Cross. “Article 1 – General Principles and Scope of 
Application.” International Committee of the Red Cross. Accessed May 26, 2016. 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750004. 
International Committee of the Red Cross. “Article 41 – Safeguard of an Enemy Hors de 
Combat.” International Committee of the Red Cross. Accessed May 26, 2016. 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&docum
entId=A792529AA66D8C56C12563CD0051DB5E. 
International Committee of the Red Cross. “Article 48 – Basic Rule.” International 
Committee of the Red Cross. Accessed May 26, 2016. 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/4e473c7bc8854f2ec12563f60039c738/8a9e7e14c63c7f3
0c12563cd0051dc5c?OpenDocument. 
International Committee of the Red Cross. “Article 50 – Definition of Civilians and 
Civilian Population.” International Committee of the Red Cross. Accessed May 
26, 2016. 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&docum
entId=E1F8F99C4C3F8FE4C12563CD0051DC8A. 
International Committee of the Red Cross. “Article 51 – Protection of the Civilian 
Population.” International Committee of the Red Cross. Accessed May 26, 2016. 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&docum
entId=4BEBD9920AE0AEAEC12563CD0051DC9E. 
International Committee of the Red Cross. “Article 52 – General Protection of Civilian 
Objects.” International Committee of the Red Cross. Accessed May 26, 2016. 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&docum
entId=F08A9BC78AE360B3C12563CD0051DCD4. 
International Committee of the Red Cross. “Article 57 – Protections in Attack.” 
International Committee of the Red Cross. Accessed May 26, 2016. 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&docum
entId=50FB5579FB098FAAC12563CD0051DD7C. 
International Committee of the Red Cross. “Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technical, 
Military, Legal and Humanitarian Aspects.” International Committee of the Red 
Cross, November 1, 2014. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-icrc-meeting-
autonomous-weapon-systems-26-28-march-2014. 
 117 
International Committee of the Red Cross. “Blinding Weapons: Alarming Report on 
Laser Weapons.” International Committee of the Red Cross, January 02, 1995. 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jmce.htm. 
International Committee of the Red Cross. “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their 
Destruction, 18 September 1997.” International Committee of the Red Cross. 
Accessed May 25, 2016. https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/580. 
International Committee of the Red Cross. “Military Necessity.” International Committee 
of the Red Cross. Accessed May 27, 2016. 
https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/glossary/military-necessity-glossary.htm. 
International Committee of the Red Cross. “View of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) on autonomous weapon system.” International Committee of 
the Red Cross, April 11, 2016. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/views-icrc-
autonomous-weapon-system. 
Israeli Air Force. “The Israeli Air Force.” Israeli Air Force. Accessed May 22, 2016. 
http://www.iaf.org.il/4968-33518-en/IAF.aspx. 
Janjua, Tehmina. “Statement by Ambassador Tehmina Janjua, PR of Pakistan.” Pakistan. 
Accessed May 23, 2016. 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/D6F11030CC982
C11C1257F93005933A0/$file/2016_LAWS+MX_GeneralExchange_Statements
_Pakistan.pdf. 
Johnston, David and David E. Sanger. “Yemen Killing Based on Rules Set out by Bush.” 
New York Times, November 6, 2002. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/06/international/middleeast/06YEME.html. 
Keane, John F., and Stephen S. Carr. “A Brief History of Early Unmanned Aircraft.” 
Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2013). Accessed May 22, 
2016. http://www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/TD/td3203/32_03-Keane.pdf. 
Keller, John. “Should Some Smart Munitions Be Classified as Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs)?” Military & Aerospace Electronics, March 24, 2015. 
http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2015/03/smart-munition-blog.html. 
Ki-Moon, Ban. “United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s Statements.” United 
Nations, November 14, 2013. http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=7276. 
Kuperman, Alan. “Obama’s Libya Debacle.” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2015. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/obamas-libya-debacle. 
Lamothe, Dan. “The killer robot threat: Pentagon examining how enemy nations could 
empower machines.” The Washington Post, March 30, 2016. 
 118 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/30/the-killer-
robot-threat-pentagon-examining-how-enemy-nations-could-empower-machines/. 
“Lasers used on Iraqi drivers who won’t stop.” MSNBC, May 18, 2006. 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12854973/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/lasers-
used-iraqi-drivers-who-wont-stop/. 
Levinson, Charles. “Israeli Robots Remake Battlefield.” The Wall Street Journal, January 
13, 2010. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB126325146524725387. 
Lin, Patrick. “Do Killer Robots Violate Human Rights?” The Atlantic, April 20, 2015. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/04/do-killer-robots-violate-
human-rights/390033/. 
Lubold, Gordon. “U.S. Strikes a Top Islamic State Operative in Libya.” Wall Street 
Journal, November 15, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-strikes-a-top-
islamic-state-operative-in-libya-1447533324. 
Mailey, Chris. “US Department of Defense 2014 Budget Analysis.” Hampton Roads 
Chapter of AUVSI, December 09, 2013. 
http://www.auvsi.org/hamptonroads/blogs/chris-mailey/2013/09/12/us-
department-of-defense-2014-budget-analysis. 
Masters, Jonathan. “Targeted Killings.” Council on Foreign Relations, May 23, 2013. 
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627. 
McFarland, Matt. “If Killer Robots Arrive, the Terminator Will Be the Least of Our 
Problems.” Washington Post, January 25, 2016. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/01/25/if-killer-
robots-arrive-the-terminator-will-be-the-least-of-our-problems/. 
McKelvey, Tara. “Drones Kill Rescuers in ‘double tap’, Say Activists.” BBC, October 
22, 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-24557333. 
McNabb, Miriam. “Regulations Matter: 3 Regions Crushing the U.S. In Drone Industry.” 
DroneLife, January 8, 2016. http://dronelife.com/2016/01/08/regulations-matter-
3-regions-crushing-the-u-s-in-drone-industry/. 
McNabb, Miriam. “Will China Dominate the Drone Market?” DroneLife, January 14, 
2016. http://dronelife.com/2016/01/14/will-china-dominate-the-drone-market/. 
Meier, Michael W. “U.S. Delegation Opening Statement.” April 11, 2016. 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/EFF7036380934E
5EC1257F920057989A/$file/2016_LAWS+MX_GeneralExchange_Statements_
United+States.pdf. 
Miller, Greg. “Increased U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan Killing Few High-Value 
Militants.” Washington Post, February 21, 2011. 
 119 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/02/20/AR2011022002975.html. 
Miller, Greg and Julie Tate. “CIA Shifts Focus to Killing Targets.” Washington Post, 
September 1, 2011. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-
shifts-focus-to-killing-targets/2011/08/30/gIQA7MZGvJ_story.html. 
Mizokami, Kyle. “The Kremlin’s Tiny Drone Tank Bristles with Weapons.” Popular 
Mechanics, January 13, 2016. 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a18948/russias-new-ground-
combat-drone-uran-9/. 
Mock-Bunting, Logan. “The Many Challenges of Underwater Communication.” Schmidt 
Ocean Institute, April 3, 2016. http://schmidtocean.org/cruise-log-post/the-many-
challenges-of-underwater-communication/. 
Molander, Johan. “Getting Together to Ban the Use of Blinding Laser Weapons.” New 
York Times, December 18, 1995. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/18/opinion/18iht-edmol.t.html. 
Mungin, Lateef. “Iran Claims Released Footage Is from Downed U.S. Drone.” CNN, 
February 7, 2013. http://edition.cnn.com/2013/02/07/world/meast/iran-drone-
video/. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology. “Autonomy Levels for Unmanned 
Systems (ALFUS) Framework, Volume I: Terminology.” National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (Ver. 2.0, NIST Special Publication 1011-I-2.0), 
October 2008. http://www.nist.gov/el/isd/ks/upload/NISTSP_1011-I-2-0.pdf. 
NATO Multinational Capability Development Campaign 2013-2014. “Policy Guidance: 
Autonomy in Defence Systems.” NATO Multinational Capability Development 
Campaign, October 29, 2014. http://innovationhub-
act.org/sites/default/files/u4/Policy%20Guidance%20-
%20Autonomy%20in%20Defence%20Systems%20MCDC%202013-2014.pdf. 
Naughton, Russell. “Remote Piloted Aerial Vehicles.” Monash University, February 02, 
2003. http://www.ctie.monash.edu/hargrave/rpav_home.html#Beginnings. 
New America. “Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis.” New America. Accessed May 22, 2016. 
http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan-analysis.html. 
New America. “Drone Wars Yemen: Analysis.” New America. Accessed May 22, 2016. 
http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/yemen-analysis.html. 
New America. “Key Findings: Drone Wars Pakistan.” New America. Accessed May 22, 
2016. http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/key-
findings.html?country=Pakistan. 
 120 
New America. “Key Findings: Drone Wars Yemen.” New America. Accessed May 22, 
2016. http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/key-
findings.html?country=Yemen. 
New America. “World of Drones.” New America. Accessed May 22, 2016. 
http://securitydata.newamerica.net/world-drones.html. 
Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) 
Treaty.” Nuclear Threat Initiative. Accessed May 22, 2016. 
http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-
space-paros-treaty/. 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “Summary of Information Regarding U.S. 
Counterterrorism Strikes Outside Areas of Active Hostilities.” Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, July 1, 2016. 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/DNI+Release
+on+CT+Strikes+Outside+Areas+of+Active+Hostilities.PDF. 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. “Genesis and Historical 
Development.” Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Accessed 
May 25, 2016. https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/genesis-and-
historical-development/. 
Parkin, Simon. “Killer Robots: The Soldiers That Never Sleep.” BBC, July 16, 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150715-killer-robots-the-soldiers-that-never-
sleep. 
Peterson, Scott and Payam Faramarzi*. “Exclusive: Iran Hijacked US Drone, Says 
Iranian Engineer (video).” The Christian Science Monitor, December 15, 2011. 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran-
hijacked-US-drone-says-Iranian-engineer-Video. 
Pew Research Center. “Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited 
Harm to America’s Image.” Pew Research Center, July 14, 2014. 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-
drones-but-limited-harm-to-americas-image/. 
Pew Research Center. “On Eve of Elections, a Dismal Public Mood in Pakistan.” Pew 
Research Center, May 7, 2013. http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/07/on-eve-of-
elections-a-dismal-public-mood-in-pakistan/. 
Pew Research Center. “Public Continues to Back U.S. Drone Attacks.” Pew Research 
Center, May 28, 2015. http://www.people-press.org/2015/05/28/public-continues-
to-back-u-s-drone-attacks/. 
“Radioplane OQ-2 - Development and Operational History, Performance Specifications 
and Picture Gallery.” Military Factory. Accessed May 26, 2016. 
http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=331. 
 121 
“Researchers Use Spoofing to ‘hack’ into a Flying Drone.” BBC, June 29, 2012. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-18643134. 
Reynolds, Mark. “Chafee Says Drone Strikes Drive the Unrest in Yemen.” PolitiFact 
Rhode Island, July 28, 2015. http://www.politifact.com/rhode-
island/statements/2015/jul/26/lincoln-chafee/chafee-says-drone-strikes-drive-
unrest-yemen/. 
Rissanen, Jenni. “The Biological Weapons Convention.” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
March 1, 2003. http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/biological-weapons-
convention/. 
Roff, Heather. “Reigning in the Killer Robot? The DoD’s Directive on Autonomous 
Weapons.” The Huffington Post, June 16, 2013. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/heather-roff/reigning-in-the-killer-
ro_b_3094675.html. 
Rothman, Wilson. “Unmanned Warbots of WWI and WWII.” Gizmodo, March 24, 2009. 
http://gizmodo.com/5181576/unmanned-warbots-of-wwi-and-wwii. 
“Russia Shows Off World-Leading Security Bots for Missile Bases.” Sputnik News, 
December 27, 2014. 
http://sputniknews.com/military/20140422/189307020/Russia-Shows-Off-World-
Leading-Security-Bots-for-Missile-Bases.html. 
Sandoval, Greg. “Sales of Commercial Drones Will Soar 84% in 2016 — Despite Safety 
Concerns.” Geek Wire, January 18, 2016. http://www.geekwire.com/2016/sales-
of-commercially-used-drones-will-soar-84-in-2016-despite-safety-concerns/. 
Sauer, Frank. “ICRAC Statement on Technical Issues to the 2014 UN CCW Expert 
Meeting.” International Committee for Robot Arms Control, July 9, 2014. 
http://icrac.net/2014/05/icrac-statement-on-technical-issues-to-the-un-ccw-expert-
meeting/. 
Scharre, Paul and Michael C. Horrowitz. “An Introduction to Autonomy in Weapon 
Systems.” Center for a New American Security, February 2015. 
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-
pdf/Ethical%20Autonomy%20Working%20Paper_021015_v02.pdf. 
Schechter, Erik. “In Defense of Killer Robots.” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2014. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/erik-schechter-in-defense-of-killer-robots-
1405035148. 
Schirch, Lisa. “9 Costs of Drone Strikes.” Huffington Post, June 28, 2012. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lisa-schirch/drones_b_1630592.html. 
 122 
Schwedler, Jillian. “Is the U.S. Drone Program in Yemen Working?” Brookings Institute, 
September 28, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/09/29-
us-drone-program-yemen. 
 “Secret Memos ’Show Pakistan Endorsed US Drone Strikes’.” BBC, October 24, 2013. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24649840. 
Serie, Jack and Payenda Sargand. “Get the Data: A List of US Air and Drone Strikes, 
Afghanistan 2015.” Bureau of Investigative Journalism, February 12, 2015. 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2015/02/12/us-drone-war-afghanistan-
list-american-air-strikes-2015/#AFG109. 
Shachtman, Noah. “Navy Plots Unmanned, Heavily Armed Fleet.” Wired, October 9, 
2007. https://www.wired.com/2007/10/navy-plots-unma/. 
Shane, Scott. “Yemen’s Leader, President Hadi, Praises U.S. Drone Strikes.” New York 
Times, August 25, 2014. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/world/middleeast/yemens-leader-president-
hadi-praises-us-drone-strikes.html?_r=0. 
Singh, Ritka, “Drone Strikes Kill Innocent People. Why Is It So Hard to Know How 
Many.” New Republic, October 25, 2013. 
https://newrepublic.com/article/115353/civilian-casualties-drone-strikes-why-we-
know-so-little. 
Smith, Alexander. “Hamas’ Drone Program Will Not Worry Israel, Experts Say.” NBC 
News, July 15, 2014. http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/middle-east-
unrest/hamas-drone-program-will-not-worry-israel-experts-say-n155341. 
Smith, Craig. “10 Interesting Drone Statistics.” DMR, February 6, 2016. 
http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/drone-statistics/. 
Sofge, Erik. “Tale of the Teletank: The Brief Rise and Long Fall of Russia’s Military 
Robots.” Popular Science, March 07, 2014. http://www.popsci.com/blog-
network/zero-moment/tale-teletank-brief-rise-and-long-fall-russia%E2%80%99s-
military-robots. 
SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific. “Cable-Controlled Underwater Recovery Vehicle 
(CURV).” SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific. Accessed May 22, 2016. 
http://www.public.navy.mil/spawar/Pacific/Robotics/Pages/CURV.aspx. 
“Special Purpose Underwater Research Vehicle (SPURV).” Naval Drones. Accessed 
May 22, 2016. http://www.navaldrones.com/SPURV.html. 
Spielmann, Peter James. “Israeli Killer Robots Could Be Banned Under UN Proposal.” 
Times of Israel, May 3, 2013. http://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-killer-robots-
could-be-banned-under-un-proposal/. 
 123 
Stamp, Jimmy. “Unmanned Drones Have Been Around Since World War I.” 
Smithsonian, February 12, 2013. http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-
culture/unmanned-drones-have-been-around-since-world-war-i-16055939/?no-ist. 
Sun, Leo. “Drones in 2016: 4 Numbers Everyone Should Know.” The Motley Fool, 
February 29, 2016. http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016/02/29/drones-in-
2016-4-numbers-everyone-should-know.aspx. 
Swarts, Phillip. “X-37B Space Plane Is Shrouded in Mystery.” Air Force Times, 
September 26, 2015. 
http://www.airforcetimes.com/story/military/tech/2015/09/26/x-37b-space-plane-
shrouded-mystery/72752826/. 
“TALON Tracked Military Robot.” Army Technology. Accessed May 22, 2016. 
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/talon-tracked-military-robot/. 
“Tadiran Mastiff - Development and Operational History, Performance Specifications 
and Picture Gallery.” Military Factory. Accessed May 22, 2016. 
http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=901. 
Tarantola, Andrew. “This Unmanned Patroller Guards Israeli Borders for Days on End.” 
Gizmodo, September 14, 2012. http://gizmodo.com/5943055/the-g-nius-
guardium-guards-golan-like-a-golem. 
“THE DRONES REPORT: Market Forecasts, Regulatory Barriers, Top Vendors, and 
Leading Commercial Applications.” Business Insider, May 10, 2016. 
http://www.businessinsider.com/uav-or-commercial-drone-market-forecast-2015-
2. 
“The Rise of ISIS,” PBS, October 28, 2014, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/rise-
of-isis/. 
United Nations. “2014 Meeting of Experts on LAWS.” United Nations Office at Geneva. 
Accessed May 23, 2016. 
http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/%28httpPages%29/a038dea1da90
6f9dc1257dd90042e261?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=1#_Section1. 
United Nations. “2015 Meeting of Experts on LAWS.” United Nations Office at Geneva. 
Accessed May 23, 2016. 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/6CE049BE22EC75
A2C1257C8D00513E26?OpenDocument. 
United Nations. “2016 Meeting of Experts on LAWS.” United Nations Office at Geneva. 
Accessed May 23, 2016. 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/37D51189AC4FB6
E1C1257F4D004CAFB2?OpenDocument. 
 124 
United Nations. “Advanced Copy of the Report of the 2015 informal Meeting of Experts 
on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS).” United Nations. Accessed 
July 14, 2016. 
http://www.genf.diplo.de/contentblob/4567632/Daten/5648966/201504berichtexp
ertentreffenlaws.pdf. 
United Nations. “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction.” United Nations. Accessed May 25, 2016. 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc. 
United Nations. “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.” United 
Nations. Accessed May 25, 2016. 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-
3&chapter=26&lang=en. 
United Nations. “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.” United Nations. 
Accessed May 25, 2016. 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-
5&chapter=26&lang=en. 
United Nations. “Meetings of the States parties.” United Nations Office at Geneva. 
Accessed May 23, 2016. 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/CE461DB2A1D128
A5C12573CD004DB6F3?OpenDocument. 
United Nations. “Report of the 2014 informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems (LAWS).” United Nations, June 11, 2014. https://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/048/96/PDF/G1404896.pdf?OpenElement. 
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. “The Biological Weapons Convention.” 
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Accessed May 25, 2016. 
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/. 
United Nations. “The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.” United Nations 
Office at Geneva. Accessed May 23, 2016. 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/4F0DEF093B4860B
4C1257180004B1B30?OpenDocument. 
United Nations. “Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons.” United Nations Office at 
Geneva. Accessed May 23, 2016. 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/8463F2782F711A
13C12571DE005BCF1A/$file/PROTOCOL+IV.pdf. 
United Nations. “United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use 
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively 
 125 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.” United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs. Accessed May 23, 2016. 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ccwc. 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. “Framing Discussion on the 
Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies.” United Nations 
Institute for Disarmament Research. Accessed May 23, 2016. 
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/framing-discussions-on-the-
weaponization-of-increasingly-autonomous-technologies-en-606.pdf. 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. “The Weaponization of Increasingly 
Autonomous Technologies: Considering how Meaningful Human Control might 
move the discussion forward.” United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research. Accessed May 23, 2016. 
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/considering-how-meaningful-
human-control-might-move-the-discussion-forward-en-615.pdf. 
“U.S. Air Force Stops Reporting Data on Afghan Drone Strikes.” Reuters, March 10, 
2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-drones-
idUSBRE92903520130310. 
U.S. Department of Defense. “Article-by-Article Analysis of Protocol on Blinding Laser 
Weapons.” U.S. Department of Defense. Accessed July 14, 2016. 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/ccwapl/artbyart_pro4.htm. 
U.S. Department of Defense. “Autonomy in Weapon Systems.” U.S. Department of 
Defense (Directive 3000.09), November 21, 2012. 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf. 
U.S. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms,” U.S. Department of Defense (Joint Publication 1-02), 
February 15, 2016, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
U.S. Department of Defense. “Unmanned Aircraft System Airspace Integration Plan.” 
U.S. Department of Defense (Ver. 2.0, 1-7ABA52E), March 2011. 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/sts/docs/DoD_UAS_Airspace_Integ_Plan_v2_%28signed
%29.pdf. 
U.S. Department of Defense. “Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030.” U.S. 
Department of Defense. Accessed May 22, 2016. 
https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav_roadmap2005.pdf. 
U.S. Department of Defense. “Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036.” 
U.S. Department of Defense (11-S-3613). Accessed May 22, 2016. 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/sts/docs/Unmanned%20Systems%20Integrated%20Road
map%20FY2011-2036.pdf. 
 126 
U.S. Department of Defense. “Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038.” 
U.S. Department of Defense (14-S-0553). Accessed May 22, 2016. 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD-USRM-2013.pdf. 
U.S. Department of Defense. “Unmanned Systems Safety Guide for DoD Acquisition.” 
U.S. Department of Defense (1st Ed., Ver. .96), January 2007. 
https://www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/Robotics/Documents/Content/ContentG
roups/Divisions1/Robotics/UMS_SafetyPolicyVer096_Released.pdf. 
U.S. DoD Defense Science Board. “Task Force Report: The Role of Autonomy in DoD 
Systems.” U.S. DoD Defense Science Board, July 2012. 
https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf. 
“U.S. Forces Begin Leaving Pakistan Drone Base.” Reuters, December 5, 2011. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-pakistan-drones-idUSN1E7B40U220111205. 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. “Nonproliferation: Agencies Could Improve 
Information Sharing and End-Use Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Exports.” U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO-12-536), July 30, 2012. 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593131.pdf. 
Wagstaff, Keith. “Jody Williams Helped Ban Landmines. Can She Stop Killer Robots?” 
NBC News, April 15, 2015. http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/jody-
williams-helped-ban-landmines-can-she-stop-killer-robots-n340661. 
Walsh, James Igoe. “The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and 
Counterterrorism Campaigns.” Strategic Studies Institute. Accessed June 11, 
2016. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1167.pdf. 
Wareham, Mary. “US Needs to Stop Tiptoeing Around the “Killer Robots” Threat.” 
Human Rights Watch, May 5, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/05/us-
needs-stop-tiptoeing-around-killer-robots-threat. 
White House, The. “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.” The White House, 
February 2003. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-
terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf. 
White House Office of the Press Secretary, The. “Fact Sheet: National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism.” The White House, June 29, 2011. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/fact-sheet-national-
strategy-counterterrorism. 
Whitlock, Craig. “Remote U.S. Base at Core of Secret Operations.” Washington Post, 
October 25, 2012. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/remote-us-base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-
11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html. 
 127 
Wolverton, Mark. “Into the Mushroom Cloud.” Air & Space, August 2009. 
http://www.airspacemag.com/history-of-flight/into-the-mushroom-cloud-
35152524/?no-ist. 
Woods, Chris. “The Story Behind America’s First Drone Strike.” The Atlantic, May 30, 
2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/america-first-
drone-strike-afghanistan/394463/. 
Woods, Chris and Mushtaq Yusufzai. “Get the Data: The Return of Double-Tap Drone 
Strikes.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, August 1, 2013. 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/08/01/get-the-data-the-return-of-
double-tap-drone-strikes/. 
Woods, Chris and Alice Ross. “Revealed: US and Britain Launched 1, 200 Drone Strikes 
in Recent Wars.” Bureau of Investigative Journalism, December 4, 2012. 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/12/04/revealed-us-and-britain-
launched-1200-drone-strikes-in-recent-wars/. 
Zenko, Micah. “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies.” Council on Foreign Relations, 
January 2013. http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-
policies/p29736. 
Zimmerman, Katherine. “Al Shabaab in Decline?” AEI, May 8, 2012. 
http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/zimmerman-al-shabaab-in-decline-may-8-
2012. 
